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ABSTRACT: The forty-year debate over whether insider trading
should be regulated has generally proceeded in all-or-nothing terms:
Either all insider trading should be permitted (subject only to private
restrictions imposed by issuers themselves), or none should. This
Article argues for an asymmetric insider trading policy under which
insider trading that decreases the price of an overvalued stock is
generally permitted, but insider trading that increases the price of an
undervalued stock is generally prohibited. Concluding that the net
investor benefits of price-decreasing insider trading exceed those of
price-enhancing insider trading, the Article argues that an
asymmetric insider trading regime likely represents the bargain that
shareholders and corporate managers would strike if they were
legally and practically able to negotiate an insider trading policy.
Current insider trading doctrine would permit regulators to impose
such an asymmetric insider trading policy as the default rule.
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OVERVALUED EQUITY AND THE CASE FOR
AN ASYMMETRIC INSIDER TRADING REGIME
Thomas A. Lambert†
We do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire
shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow
range centered at intrinsic value…. [We] are bothered as
much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation.
—Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report, 1988
INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffett is an anomaly. In expressing concern about the potential
overvaluation of his company’s stock, the chairman and CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway Inc. has distinguished himself from the vast majority of corporate
managers, most of whom believe (or at least act as if they believe) that their
highest end is to maximize their company’s stock price.1 But Mr. Buffett is
right to be bothered by overvaluation. Recent events in the financial world
have revealed that overvaluation can be extremely damaging to a firm and
its shareholders.2 This revelation calls for a rethinking of insider trading
policy.
For four decades now, corporate law scholars have debated whether the
government should prohibit insider trading,3 commonly defined as stock
†
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See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 5-6
(2005) (“To my knowledge, with the exception of Warren Buffett (who hints at
these forces in his 1988 letter to Berkshire shareholders) no leaders in the business
or financial community have recognized the dangers of overvalued equity.”).
2

See id. See also infra notes 132 - 217 and accompanying text (discussing investor
harms occasioned by equity overvaluation).
3

Earnest debate over the wisdom of an insider trading prohibition began some forty
years ago with the publication of Henry Manne’s book, Insider Trading and the

trading on the basis of material, non-public information.4 Participants in this
long-running debate have generally assumed that trading that decreases a
stock’s price (“price-decreasing insider trading”) should be treated the same
as trading that causes the price to rise (“price-enhancing insider trading”):
Either both forms of trading should be regulated, or neither should. This
Article considers whether there is a principled basis for affording different
legal treatment to the two species of insider trading. It concludes that pricedecreasing insider trading should be treated less harshly than priceenhancing insider trading.
The reason for the proposed asymmetric treatment is that pricedecreasing insider trading provides significantly more value to investors
than price-enhancing insider trading. Specifically, price-decreasing insider
trading provides an effective means – perhaps the only cost-effective means5
– of combating the problem of overvalued equity, a problem whose
Stock Market. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966). The literature comprising the debate is far too voluminous to cite
exhaustively. For an excellent overview of the debate, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Insider Trading, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 777-94 (1999)
(available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5650book.pdf). For arguments defending
the legal prohibition on insider trading, see, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any
Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV.
1425 (1967). For arguments in favor of deregulation of insider trading, see, e.g.,
Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857 (1983).
4

See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 519 (2002).
Congress and securities regulators have recently sought to reduce the costs of
equity overvaluation by enacting laws and adopting rules designed to prevent firms
from becoming overvalued as a result of misinformation. Most notably, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745, which was adopted
hastily in the panic atmosphere created by the implosion of Enron Corporation and a
massive accounting fraud at WorldCom Inc., see Roberta Romano, The SarbanesOxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521,
1549-68 (2005) (detailing Act’s political history and demonstrating lack of careful
attention to costs and benefits of its reforms), imposes a number of restrictions
designed to prevent overvaluation occasioned by accounting fraud. See Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 11-18 (2002) (summarizing key
provisions of Act). Early indications are that the Act’s restrictions do not create
investor benefits commensurate with their substantial costs. See Larry E. Ribstein,
Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, U. Ill. Law & Economics Research Paper No.
LE05-016 (June 20, 2005) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=746884); Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101) (reviewing empirical studies evaluating
effectiveness of key Sarbanes-Oxley provisions).
5
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magnitude commentators are just beginning to appreciate.6 Overvalued
equity, which occurs when a stock’s price becomes so high that it cannot be
justified by expected future earnings,7 leads managers to take a number of
value-destroying actions. Corporate insiders, of course, are in the best
position to know when the stock of their company is overvalued, and
deregulation of price-decreasing insider trading would create a means by
which they could signal the market that the stock price is too high, thereby
avoiding the costs associated with overvalued equity. While deregulation of
price-enhancing insider trading could similarly remedy the problem of
undervalued equity, undervaluation causes fewer problems than
overvaluation, and there are numerous other mechanisms for addressing that
sort of mispricing. Moreover, the potential investor losses associated with
price-enhancing insider trading are higher than those associated with pricedecreasing trading. Most corporations would therefore likely opt to permit
(at least some) price-decreasing insider trading, while generally restricting
price-enhancing insider trading.
Of course, the signaling effect of price-decreasing insider trading, and
thus its salutary price effect, would be stronger if the trades were publicly
announced when executed. Accordingly, the Article concludes that most
corporations would, if practically and legally able to do so, adopt an
asymmetric insider trading regime that would generally permit pricedecreasing insider trades as long as they were immediately announced to the
public. Public disclosure would have the added benefit of policing potential
mismanagement by insiders, who might otherwise be tempted to delay the
transmission of “bad news” or even to create such news in an attempt to
generate trading profits. Given that most investors and corporate managers
would bargain for an insider trading policy generally permitting disclosed
price-decreasing insider trading, while restricting price-enhancing insider
trading, regulators should posit such a policy as the default that will govern
in the absence of express contracting. Current insider trading doctrine
would permit them to do so.8

6

See generally Jensen, supra note 1.

7

Id. at 5 (“Equity is overvalued when a firm’s stock price is higher than its
underlying value. … By definition, an overvalued equity means the company will
not be able to deliver – except by pure luck – the performance to justify its value.”).
8

While current insider trading doctrine would likely permit corporations to adopt
policies liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading, corporations have not done so,
most likely because regulators have not expressly promised them (and their
insiders) immunity. The SEC has a long history of seeking to expand the insider
trading prohibition. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 583-86 (discussing
regulators’ zeal to expand insider trading prohibition beyond limits of enabling
statute). While (as argued in Part III) a corporation legally could authorize price-

3

The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly summarizes the longrunning policy debate over insider trading. Part II describes the problem of
overvalued equity, explains why price-decreasing insider trading will create
greater investor benefits and impose lower investor costs than priceenhancing insider trading, and describes the sort of asymmetric insider
trading policy most corporations would adopt if expressly permitted to do
so. Part III, then, argues that regulators could approve this sort of
asymmetric insider trading regime under current law, even if the law is more
hostile to insider trading than some advocates of insider trading deregulation
assume.
I.

Summary of the Insider Trading Debate

The federal insider trading prohibition co-exists somewhat uneasily with
the rest of the securities laws. Whereas the general aim of most of the
securities laws is to ensure the accurate pricing of securities by requiring
dissemination to the market of information regarding the true value of
securities, the insider trading prohibition explicitly prohibits certain types of
trading on the basis of material, non-public information, thereby preventing
such trades from informing the market regarding the true value of the
securities at issue.9 The result is a schizophrenic regulatory regime in which
certain value-revealing disclosures are mandated, but certain value-revealing
trades are forbidden. Such regulatory schizophrenia may make sense if
there are harms associated with value-revealing insider trading, and, of
course, proponents of the insider trading ban insist that there are. Thus, a
debate has raged for the last forty years regarding whether there truly are
harms associated with insider trading and, if so, whether they eclipse the
harms created by the insider trading ban. Because an understanding of the
case for an asymmetric insider trading regime requires a working
understanding of the broader policy debate over the insider trading ban, I
begin with a brief summary of the debate.10
Defenders of the ban on insider trading insist that it is fundamentally
unfair for some traders to have an informational advantage over others,
particularly when the advantaged traders are corporate insiders who are
decreasing insider trading, if it did so, it would almost certainly face a lawsuit by
zealous regulators.
9

See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 605 (“The basic function of a securities fraud
regime is to ensure timely disclosure of accurate information to investors. Yet, it
seems indisputable that the insider trading prohibition does not lead to increased
disclosure.”).
10

Because excellent and detailed summaries of the debate exist elsewhere, my
summary is somewhat cursory. For additional detail, see Bainbridge, supra note 3,
at 777-94; Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 583-607.
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supposed to be acting as agents for those who lack the informational
advantage.11 Ban defenders also contend that insider trading causes
efficiency losses by (1) discouraging investment in the apparently rigged
stock market, thereby reducing the liquidity of capital markets;12
(2) encouraging insiders to delay disclosures13 and to make management
decisions that increase share price volatility but do not maximize firm
value;14 and (3) increasing the “bid-ask” spread of stock specialists, who
systematically lose on trades with insiders (whom they cannot identify ex
ante) and will thus tend to “insure” against such losses by charging a small
premium on each trade.15 Finally, some defenders of the ban assert that it is
11

See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 3, at 1439 (“Even if we found that unfettered
insider trading would bring an economic gain, we might still forego that gain in
order to secure a stock market and intracorporate relationships that satisfy such
noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards and integrity.”). Other sources
articulating versions of this fairness argument are cited in note 40, infra.
12

See Jeffrey M. Laderman et al., The Epidemic of Insider Trading, BUS. WK.,
April 29, 1995, at 78 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as stating, “If the
investor thinks he’s not getting a fair shake, he’s not going to invest, and that’s
going to hurt capital markets in the long run.”); Lawrence M. Ausubel, Insider
Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1022, 1022-23
(1990) (asserting that insider trading deters potential investors from securities
markets, as outsiders want to avoid dilution of their investment returns); Louis Loss,
The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate “Insiders” in the
United States, 33 MOD. L. REV. 34, 36 (1970) (arguing that insider trading
constitutes a “grievous insult to the market in the sense that the very preservation of
any capital market depends on liquidity, which rests in turn on the investor’s
confidence that current quotations accurately reflect the objective value of his
investment”).
13

See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency
of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-55 (1982) (arguing that, if
insider trading were permitted, “subordinates would stall the upward flow of critical
information to maximize their opportunities for financial gain,” resulting in an
“impair[ment] [of] corporate decision-making at all hierarchical levels”).
14

See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (noting that if insider trading is
permitted “an insider can profit from a decrease in the firm’s stock price as well as
in increase; the temptation of profit might actually encourage an insider to act
against the corporation’s interest”); Morris Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 470, 489-90 (1969); Schotland, supra note 3, at 1451.
15

Jack L. Treynor, Securities Law and Public Policy, 50 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 10, 10
(1994) (“[Informed] trades can damage the dealer, perhaps fatally. That’s a valid
reason for discouraging trading on so-called ‘inside’ information, quite apart from
whether such trading entails misappropriation of corporate property or wire
fraud.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y. L.J., July
31, 1997, at 5 (“[T]he more that the law successfully prohibits the use of non-public
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justified as a means of protecting the corporation’s property rights in
valuable information regarding firm prospects.16
Proponents of the deregulation of insider trading discount these
arguments and assert that insider trading can be beneficial on the whole and
ought to be limited, if at all, only by corporations themselves via contract.17
With respect to the fairness argument, deregulation proponents retort that
insider trading cannot be “unfair” to investors if they know in advance that it
might occur and nonetheless choose to engage in the purportedly unfair
trades.18 Moreover, deregulation proponents assert, the purported efficiency
losses occasioned by insider trading are overblown. There is little evidence,
they say, that insider trading reduces liquidity by discouraging individuals
from investing in the stock market,19 and it might actually increase such
liquidity by providing benefits to investors in equities.20 With respect to the
claim that insider trading creates incentives for delayed disclosures and
value-reducing management, advocates of deregulation claim that such
mismanagement is unlikely for several reasons. First, managers face
reputational constraints that will discourage such misbehavior.21 In
addition, managers, who generally work in teams, cannot engage in value-

information, the more that the market maker can (and will be forced by competitive
pressure to) narrow the bid-ask spread.”); Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai,
Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983); Lawrence R.
Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
16

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 598-607.

17

See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3.

18

Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807-09 (1980) (observing that if the existence of insider
trading is known, outsiders will not be disadvantaged because the price they pay
will reflect the risk of insider trading); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP.
CT. REV. 309, 323-30 (discussing and refuting fairness arguments).
19

See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 880 n. 76 (“[T]he notion that
exchanges are harmed by insider trading is hard to square with the following facts:
(1) the stock market was successful pre-1933 (before insider trading laws); (2) the
stock market was successful pre-1960’s (before judicial extension of insider trading
laws); (3) the stock market is currently successful despite the existence of legal and
perhaps illegal insider trading.”).

20

Cf. id. at 881 (“Compensating managers [by permitting insider trading] increases
the size of the pie, and thus outsiders as well as insiders profit from the incentives
managers are given to increase the value of the firm.”).
21

See id. at 874 (noting that a manager will be motivated, at least in part, by “his
long run interest in his human capital”).
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destroying mismanagement without persuading their colleagues to go along
with the strategy, and any particular employee’s ability to engage in
mismanagement will therefore be constrained by her colleagues’ attempts to
maximize firm value or to gain personally by exposing proposed
mismanagement.22 With respect to the argument that insider trading raises
the cost of trading securities by increasing the bid-ask spread, proponents of
deregulation point to empirical evidence discounting this purported effect of
insider trading.23 Finally, deregulation proponents assert that, even if
material non-public information is worthy of property protection, the
property right need not be a non-transferable interest granted to the
corporation; efficiency considerations may call for the right to be
transferable and/or initially allocated to a different party (e.g., to insiders).24
In addition to rebutting the arguments for regulation, proponents of
deregulation have offered affirmative arguments for liberalizing insider
trading. First, they maintain that insider trading should generally be
permitted because it increases stock market efficiency (i.e., the degree to
which stock prices reflect true value), which helps guarantee efficient
resource allocation.25 Corporate insiders, after all, generally know more
22

See id. at 873-74 (observing that “[m]anagers often work in teams and thus must
first persuade one another that the firm should undertake a particular strategy” and
that “the ability of any one manager to pursue bad opportunities will be constrained
because other managers and employees will attempt to maximize the firm’s value”).
23

See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 (2004)
(surveying empirical evidence regarding insider trading’s effect on bid-ask spread
and liquidity).
24

See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the
Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 32 (1984) (defending use of
insider trading law to protect rights to information but arguing that “property
owners” – i.e., the corporations to whom the right to inside information is allocated
– should be “permitted to contract as to the use of the information they own.”);
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 878 (noting that contention that inside
information is property “does not address the key question of why the firm and not
the managers always should be allocated the property right in information”);
Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 331 (approving property rights approach but noting
that “insider trading should be permitted to the extent the firm that created the
information desires (or tolerates) such trading. The firm extracts value through
exploiting the knowledge itself or reducing the salary of those who exploit it.”).
25

Although there is some disagreement concerning the extent and timeliness of the
price effect occasioned by insider trading, there is near consensus among
economists that insider trading pushes the price of a stock in the right direction.
Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did
Not Bark, ICER Working Paper No. 7-2005 at 4 (March 2005) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=679662). For empirical data demonstrating that insider
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about their company’s prospects than anyone else. When they purchase or
sell their own company’s stock, thus betting their own money that the
company is mispriced, they convey valuable information to the marketplace.
Assuming their trades somehow become public, other rational investors will
likely follow their lead, which will cause stock prices to reflect more
accurately the underlying value of the firm.26 More efficient stock prices,
then, will lead to a more efficient allocation of productive resources
throughout the economy.27
Deregulation advocates further maintain that corporations ought to be
allowed to adopt liberal insider trading policies because permitting insider
trading could be an efficient form of managerial compensation.28 The
argument here is that competition in the managerial labor and capital
markets will lead corporations to adopt efficient insider trading policies.29
trading results in rapid incorporation of the impact of nonpublic information into
market price, see Ji-Chai Lin & Michael S. Rozeff, The Speed of Adjustment of
Prices to Private Information: Empirical Tests, 18 J. FIN. RES. 143 (1995); Lisa K.
Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661
(1992). For data from laboratory experiments suggesting that inside information is
rapidly assimilated into market price, even when very few insiders participate in the
market, see Martin Barner, et al., On the Microstructure of Price Determination and
Information Aggregation with Sequential and Asymmetric Information Arrival in an
Experimental Asset Market, 1 ANNALS FIN. 1 (2005); Daniel Friedman, et al., The
Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349
(1982). For theory supporting a rapid assimilation view, see Charles R. Plott &
Shyam Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider
Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. POL. ECON.
663 (1982) (demonstrating using simulation techniques that markets adjust very
rapidly to inside information). For arguments that the price effect is less extent and
rapid, see Sugato Chakravarty & John J. McConnell, Does Insider Trading Really
Move Stock Prices?, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 191 (1999) (presenting
data suggesting that informed trading by insiders has the same price affect as
uninformed trading by outsiders); James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting:
A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”, 1986 DUKE L. J. 628, 646 (asserting
that insider trading is a noisy device for communicating stock value). For the
outlier view that insider trading does not push stock prices in the right direction, see
Vernon L. Smith, et al., Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in
Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1119 (1988).
26

See infra notes 261 - 272 and accompanying text (discussing how insider trades
lead to more efficient securities prices).
27

See infra notes 121 - 123 and accompanying text (discussing allocative
inefficiencies occasioned by inaccurate securities prices).

28

See, e.g., Manne, supra note 3, at 116-19; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 86971.
29
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-63.
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On the one hand, the market for managerial labor may reward corporations
with liberal insider trading policies, for the right to make money through
insider trading is valuable to potential managers. On the other hand, capital
market pressures will prevent corporations from adopting insider trading
policies that are, on balance, harmful to investors. Because granting
managers the right to engage in insider trading lowers their salary
requirements and creates an incentive for them to create “good news” for the
corporation, the capital markets might reward firms with liberal insider
trading policies.30 To the extent insider trading causes investor harm in
excess of these benefits, however, it will be disfavored by investors, who
will price the firm’s securities accordingly. Thus, deregulation advocates
maintain that the interaction of the labor and capital markets will assure that
firms will adopt insider trading policies that are, on the whole, valuemaximizing.31
Professor Manne, perhaps the founder of the deregulatory camp,32 has
recently articulated what he characterizes as a third affirmative argument for
deregulation of insider trading: He asserts that insider trading lowers the
cost of managerial decisionmaking by providing managers with valuable
information that they could not otherwise cost-effectively obtain.33 Drawing
on F. A. Hayek’s famous observation that the chief problem facing
managers charged with resource allocation decisions is the fact that timeand space-specific information is widely distributed,34 Professor Manne
contends that corporate managers similarly face informational constraints.
Just as Hayek saw the price mechanism as the primary solution to the
problem of resource allocation generally,35 Professor Manne maintains that
the price information generated by insider trading can similarly guide
30

But see Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 332 (arguing that the right to engage in
insider trading is an inefficient compensation mechanism not likely to be selected
by corporations).
31
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-66.
32

See supra note 3; see also Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required
Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION:
THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (1974); Henry G.
Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970).
33

See Manne, supra note 25, at 14-16. Professor Manne contends that the
managerial benefits created by insider trading explain why investors and managers
neither adopted contractual insider trading restrictions nor called for regulation of
insider trading prior to the 1960s, when the SEC began regulating the practice in
earnest. Id. at 19.
34

F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20
(1945).
35

Id. at 526.
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corporate managers in making decisions about how to allocate firm
resources.36
Not surprisingly, the affirmative case for liberalizing insider trading has
not gone unchallenged. With regard to the argument that insider trading
leads to more efficient securities prices, ban proponents retort that trading
by insiders conveys information only to the extent it is revealed, and even
then the message it conveys is “noisy” or ambiguous, given that insiders
may trade for a variety of reasons, many of which are unrelated to their
possession of inside information.37 Ban defenders further maintain that
insider trading is an inefficient, clumsy, and possibly perverse compensation
mechanism.38 With regard to Professor Manne’s novel “managerial
benefits” argument, ban defenders will likely respond with a version of their
argument that insider trading is a noisy signaling device.39 After all, the fact
that the market value of the entire firm is rising or falling would not seem to

36

Manne, supra note 25, at 14-21. Manne’s notion that insider trading creates
“prices” that guide firm managers is innovative. Conventional economic theory has
drawn a distinction between the market, in which resources are allocated in a
decentralized fashion according to the price mechanism, and the firm, in which
resources are allocated via managerial fiat without reference to prices (which
generally do not exist within the firm). See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 389 (1937) (arguing that “the distinguishing mark of the
firm is the suppression of the price mechanism”). Professor Manne suggests that
insider trading may generate effective “prices” to guide resource allocation within
firms.
37

See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakmen, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 574 (1984).
38

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 591-92 (criticizing insider trading as
compensation mechanism because (1) insider’s compensation would be determined,
in part, by his wealth; (2) the right to trade could not be limited to the insiders who
created value-enhancing information; (3) “[a]llowing managers to profit from inside
trading reduces the penalties associated with a project’s failure”; and (4) the value
of the compensation is contingent and difficult to measure in advance and thus
would be less desirable to managers); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 332.
39

See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Indeed, it would be proper for ban
proponents to reiterate their “noisy signal” argument here, for Professor Manne’s
managerial benefits argument is ultimately a version of the “traditional” argument
that insider trading enhances allocative efficiency by increasing the efficiency of
stock prices. Whereas the traditional argument focused on investors’ allocation of
capital, Professor Manne’s latest argument focuses on managers’ allocation of
corporate resources. But, of course, managers making decisions about how to
allocate corporate resources are ultimately acting as “investors,” and the role insider
trading plays in guiding managers is similar to that which it plays in guiding
individual investors.
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convey much helpful information to a manager attempting to make a narrow
management decision about one particular aspect of firm operations.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the well-worn insider trading debate
is its starkness: Assuming that insider trading must be treated as a whole,
ban defenders and opponents have argued over liberalization in all-ornothing terms. They have not considered whether some species of insider
trading should be treated differently than others. Part II of this Article
argues that price-decreasing insider trading (“PDIT”), which consists of
trading by insiders on the basis negative non-public information, provides
greater net benefits to investors than price-enhancing insider trading
(“PEIT”), which consists of trading by insiders on the basis of positive nonpublic information. Accordingly, the law should treat PDIT (i.e., insider
sales, short sales, or purchases of put options) less harshly than PEIT (i.e.,
insider purchases of stock or call options).
II.

The Case for Asymmetric Treatment of Price-Increasing
and Price-Decreasing Insider Trading

The argument presented herein posits efficiency as the touchstone.40 In
other words, it starts with the assumption that whether insider trading should
40

This is controversial. See Benjamin Alarie, Dividend Entitlements and
Intermediate Default Rules, 9 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 135, 137 (2004) (recognizing
disagreement over ultimate criteria). While most scholars considering whether
insider trading should be deregulated have taken efficiency as the determinative
criterion, see, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS,
AND POLICY (1991); Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal
and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35 (1986); Carlton & Fischel, supra
note 3; Easterbrook, supra note 18; David D. Haddock, Insider Trading: Academic
Hostility and SEC Acquiescence: Henry Manne’s Insider Trading, 50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 313 (1999); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasean Model of
Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and
Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123 (1998); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider
Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801
(1980); Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive
Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291 (1999), many others have focused on
various philosophical formulations of fairness, see, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of
Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 727 (1988); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and
Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119 (2002); Saul Levmore, Securities
and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982);
Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal,
Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 (1992); Kim
Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principles in
the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999). Because a liberalized
insider trading policy would not seem “unfair” if investors knew in advance that
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be deregulated depends on whether the benefits of permitting such trading
(or, more accurately, of letting issuers decide for themselves whether or not
to do so) exceed the costs of doing so. Accordingly, the case for
asymmetric treatment of PEIT and PDIT is structured around consideration
of the relative costs and benefits of the two species of insider trading.
Subpart A compares the benefits of PEIT and PDIT by focusing on the
relative costs of undervalued and overvalued equity. Observing that equity
overvaluation is more costly to investors than equity undervaluation,
Subpart A concludes that PDIT provides greater benefit to investors, and to
society in general, than PEIT. Subpart B, then, compares the costs of PEIT
and PDIT, concluding that the former imposes greater costs on investors
than the latter. Subpart C argues that a policy permitting PDIT while
banning PEIT is likely the majoritarian default rule—i.e., the approach most
corporate managers and investors would negotiate were they able to do so.
A. Greater Benefits From Price-Decreasing Insider Trading
Somewhat curiously, legal scholars have paid little attention to the
difference between stock overvaluation and undervaluation.41 Professor
Marcel Kahan, for example, ignored the distinction in setting forth a
somewhat elaborate and otherwise exhaustive taxonomy of stock price
inaccuracies.42 Acknowledging that stock prices can exhibit different types
of inaccuracy and that securities policy should distinguish between these
inaccuracies, Professor Kahan classified inaccuracies in terms of cause
(what caused the pricing inaccuracy?),43 manifestation (how did the
such trading might occur and nonetheless chose to purchase or sell the stock at
issue, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, this Article focuses on efficiency
considerations.
41

A share of common stock entitles its holder to a pro-rata share of the
corporation’s “free cash flow,” or cash flow that is not needed for current or future
operations. Accordingly, the true value of a stock is the present value of the future
payments the shareholder expects to receive, discounted for non-diversifiable risk
(i.e., risk that cannot be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks). See
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
72 (5th ed. 1996); Merritt B. Fox, et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 345 (2003) (defining a
share of stock’s “actual value” at any point in time as “the aggregate future stream
of income—dividends and other distributions—paid out from then on to whoever
holds the share over the lifetime of the firm (discounted to present value).”). A
stock is overvalued if its market price is higher than this value and undervalued if
this value exceeds the stock’s market price.
42

See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L. J. 977, 988 (1992).
43

Id. at 988.
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mispricing qualitatively manifest itself?),44 and scope (what was the
magnitude of the mispricing?).45 Nowhere in his helpful and complex
taxonomy did Professor Kahan consider the relevance of direction – i.e.,
whether the price was inaccurately great or inaccurately small. Instead, he
apparently assumed that overvaluation by a certain degree is equivalent, in
terms of effect, to undervaluation by that same degree. Similarly, Professor
Lynn Stout’s work down-playing the costs of stock price inaccuracy has
assumed that overly high stock prices create essentially the same problems
as stock prices that are too low.46
This assumption is wrong. As explained below stock overvaluation
tends to cause greater investor harm than undervaluation. Accordingly,
insider trading that reduces the price of overvalued equity will provide
greater investor benefits than insider trading that increases the price of
undervalued equity. The following discussion explains why equity
overvaluation is more likely to occur and persist,47 is more difficult to
correct,48 and is likely to cause greater investor harm49 than equity
undervaluation.
1. Overvaluation Is More Likely to Occur and Persist than
Undervaluation.
Stock prices may deviate from fundamental value for several reasons.50
First, prices may be inaccurate because of non-public information. Given
thatstock prices ultimately reflect expected future cash flows,51 and traders’
expectations are based on publicly available information, the concealment or
non-disclosure of material information regarding a company’s future
prospects may result in an inaccurate stock price.52 So, for example, if a
44

Id. at 994.

45

Id. at 999.

46

Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 640-43 (1988)
(focusing on efficient capital allocation as primary social benefit of accurate stock
prices and drawing no distinction between overvaluation and undervaluation).
47

Infra notes 50-87, 94-120 and accompanying text.

48

Infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.

49

Infra notes 121-217 and accompanying text.

50

Kahan, supra note 42, at 988 (cataloguing reasons stock prices may deviate from
fundamental values).
51

See supra note 41.

52

Kahan, supra note 42, at 988. Even adherents of the semi-strong version of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis admit that concealment or non-disclosure of
material information may result in stock prices that fail to reflect the true value of
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mining company has discovered a major ore strike but no one outside the
company knows about the discovery, the stock price of the company, failing
to incorporate the news that the company stands to make more money in the
future because of the ore discovery, will be inaccurately low.53 Stock price
inaccuracies may also result from investor misassessment of public
information (i.e., from investors improperly weighing public information in
determining their willingness to pay for the stock at issue);54 from
speculative trading (i.e., from investors determining willingness-to-pay not
by their beliefs about the intrinsic value of the stock but by their beliefs
about what others will be willing to pay for the stock in the future);55 or

the underlying securities. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets,
Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 418 (2004) (noting
that “material nonpublic information” is “not included in the ‘semi-strong’ form of
efficiency”).
53

Cf. Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968).
54

Kahan, supra note 42, at 989 (“[A] select group of especially skillful investors
may arrive at an assessment of fundamental stock value that is consistently more
precise than the share price determined by the stock market.”) Note that while this
is a possibility, aggregate assessments of worth are normally more accurate than
individual assessments of value. See Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of
Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573
(1976); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3-39 (2004) (presenting an
accessible and highly entertaining assertion of this position).
55

Kahan, supra note 42, at 990-92. John Maynard Keynes famously articulated this
point in his amusing beauty contest analogy:
[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds
to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that
each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself
finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the
problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing
those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest,
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the
prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the
average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who
practice the fourth, fifth, and higher degrees.

JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
156 (MacMillan & Co. 1947) (1936).
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from liquidity crunches (i.e., the price-affecting surpluses and shortages that
occur when investors engage in speculative trading).56
For each of these sources of inaccuracy, information is the antidote.
This point should be obvious for inaccuracies caused by non-public
information, but it is true for the other sources of inaccuracy as well.
Misassessment errors can be corrected if those with superior assessment
skills – i.e., securities analysts and corporate managers, who know the
business best – educate the investing public as to why the stock at issue is
mispriced. Periods of speculative trading, which tend to be rather shortlived in any event, can be halted if managers or analysts inform enough
traders that the speculation-driven stock price is diverting from true value
and is likely to return to a more accurate level. And, of course, mispricing
created by a liquidity crunch will be corrected by an information campaign
that halts the speculative trading causing the liquidity crunch.
Given that a lack of information is behind practically all instances of
stock mispricing, it should not be at all surprising that the bulk of securities
mispricing occurs in the direction of overvaluation rather than
undervaluation.57 Equity overvaluation is more likely to occur and persist
than undervaluation because the entities most likely to provide the
information that would correct mispricing – i.e., corporate managers and
stock analysts – are much more likely to do so, and have better tools for
doing so, when the mispricing is in the negative direction.
a. Management Is Less Likely to Correct
Overvaluation.
While there are persuasive arguments in favor of the view that corporate
managers, seeking to protect their reputations for trustworthiness, will have
a tendency toward candor,58 there are numerous reasons to believe that
56

Kahan, supra note 42, at 992-93.

57

See Mark T. Finn, Russell J. Fuller & John L. Kling, Equity Mispricing: It’s
Mostly on the Short Side, 55-6 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 117 (1999). Utilizing data on
price earnings ratios and the level of firm repurchases and issuances of new stock,
the authors identified two portfolios of mispriced stocks, one undervalued and one
overvalued. Id. at 119-20. Whereas the undervalued stocks modestly outperformed
the market, the overvalued stocks dramatically underperformed. Id. at 120-23. The
authors thus concluded that stock mispricing is “mostly on the short side.”
58

During periods when a company is not seeking to raise money in the capital
markets (i.e., most of the time), managers would appear to have little to gain, and
much to lose, from false optimism. Because the disappointing truth is likely to
emerge eventually, managers who conceal negative information are likely to get
caught, subjecting their firm and themselves to potential adverse reputational and
legal consequences. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
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managers will tend to be systematically optimistic in their portrayals of their
corporation’s business and will thus be less likely to correct over-pricing
than under-pricing. As Professor Donald Langevoort has explained,
corporate managers face “last period” and “multiple audience” problems,
cognitive and motivational biases, and information flow difficulties that,
taken together, lead them to highlight price-enhancing information while
suppressing price-decreasing information.59 Moreover, even if managers
were motivated to correct overvaluation, they might not be able to do so, for
overvaluation is more difficult to correct than undervaluation.60
i. Last Period and Multiple Audience Problems
While a corporate manager’s candor tends to create trust in the capital
markets and to further the firm’s (and the manager’s own) long-run
interests,61 managers may nonetheless fail to be forthcoming with stock
price-correcting bad news because they face “last period” and “multiple
audience” problems. The “last period” problem exists when the undisclosed
news is so bad that it might cause insolvency or some kind of managerial

Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-77
(1984) (describing management’s interest in its own trustworthiness). In theory,
senior managers – those in charge of corporate disclosure – should have a natural
tendency toward candor, for their interests are contractually aligned with the longterm success of the firm (often as reflected in its share price), and the firm and its
share price are more likely to be successful in the long run if management develops
a reputation for honesty and forthrightness. See Donald Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 106 (1997)
(noting that, according to conventional economic analysis, “the interests of the
company’s highest executives are usually (albeit not always) fairly closely aligned
with the ongoing interests of the firm, so that the question of why senior managers
would engage in secondary-market deception remains an interesting one”); id. at
112 (“Senior management’s group interests are contractually aligned with the longterm success of the firm as reflected in its share price, and the firm benefits from a
reputation for honesty.”). This tendency toward candor should be strengthened by
the fact that disclosure decisions are usually made by teams of managers, so
deception or concealment generally requires a sort of complicity that invites
defection by individuals seeking to further their own reputations. Id. (“Given that
some concerted effort by senior managers is usually required to distort the market
successfully, there are difficult coordination problems that act as natural deterrents
to this kind of conspiracy.”).
59

Langevoort, supra note 58, at 114-56.

60

See Jensen, supra note 1, at 14-17 (explaining why measures that typically correct
undervaluation cannot correct overvaluation).
61

See supra note 58.

16

shake-up.62 If senior managers think the undisclosed bad news will result in
company insolvency or in their being fired or demoted, then they may
decide that the costs to them of misleading disclosures (or omissions) are
less than the costs to them of candor.63 Thus, they may forego candor when
they possess price-decreasing information, whereas they almost certainly
would not do so if the undisclosed news were price-enhancing.
The “multiple audience” problem results from the fact that corporate
managers cannot make targeted disclosures of negative information only to
shareholders. When managers make a corporate disclosure, they inform not
only shareholders, but also other corporate constituencies, such as
consumers, employees, and suppliers.64 They may therefore conceal pricedecreasing information in order to protect relationships with those
constituencies, even though doing so may injure the firm’s relationship with
investors, thereby raising the cost of capital, etc.65
ii. Cognitive and Motivational Biases That
Produce Excessive Optimism
The last period and multiple audience problems explain why even
wholly rational managers sometimes refrain from revealing price-decreasing
information. Irrational optimism among managers would, of course,
exacerbate the situation. Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that

62

See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 724-27
(summarizing data showing that fraud on the market generally occurs when agents
are afraid they are in their last period of employment). See also Reinier Kraakman,
et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L. J. 1733,
1760 n. 80 (1994) (endorsing the view of Arlen and Carney).
63

Langevoort, supra note 58, at 114 (“If the senior management group believes that
it faces the threat of company insolvency, with the high probability of group firing,
then it will see the tradeoff for not lying as one of the threatened loss of salary,
bonuses, and perquisites, plus any personal reputational damage resulting from such
a termination.”); Arlen & Carney, supra note 62, at 693 (noting that “Fraud on the
Market usually occurs when agents fear themselves to be in their last period of
employment.”).

64

Langevoort, supra note 58, at 116 (“When a company issues a press release, there
are many different groups of audience, and no public form of communication is
capable of simultaneously delivering one message to investors while sending a
completely different message to another group.”).

65

Id. (noting that “fake optimism,” which seems puzzling if viewed only in terms of
investor relations, “is not so puzzling if we see the false publicity as directed to
other audiences,” such as retailers and customers).
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managers may be subject to cognitive and motivational biases66 that
manifest themselves in an irrational tendency to discount negative corporate
developments and to be falsely optimistic about their firms’ chances of
success.
a. Confirmatory and Commitment
Biases
Cognitive psychologists have observed that individuals who must
process a large volume of information frequently adopt heuristics, or mental
shortcuts, to assist them with that task.67 Often, those heuristics involve the
creation of coherent “stories” into which the individuals attempt to “fit” the
information they receive.68
Confronted with sufficient inconsistent
information, individuals will eventually revise their stories to fit the
evidence, but such revision requires the use of scarce cognitive resources
and is therefore disfavored. Thus, in an attempt to process information as
efficiently as possible, individuals will unconsciously tend to construe
information and events in a manner that confirms their prior beliefs,
attitudes, and impressions.69 For corporate managers, this tendency may
66

Cognitive biases result from the fact that individuals are simply incapable of
processing the tremendous amount of information available to them (i.e., their
rationality is “bounded”). Those biases manifest themselves as mental shortcuts, or
“heuristics,” designed to permit individuals to process the vast quantities of
information they encounter. Langevoort, supra note 58, at 134 n. 113 (noting that
cognitive biases “exist simply to manage complexity and make action possible in a
world of bounded rationality”). Motivational biases, by contrast, do not directly
assist in cognition but instead help an individual achieve some (perhaps latently)
desired end other than mere cognition. Id. (“[Motivational] biases exist because
they serve some adaptive function not grounded in rationality, and thus are the more
likely source of mythical beliefs.”).

67

Langevoort, supra note 58, at 135 (“A well-documented tendency of people who
must operate in noisy informational environments is to adopt heuristic forms of
thought.”).

68

Id. (“Commonly, people build schemas to provide them with ‘best available’
interpretations.”).
69

Id. (“When given enough motivation, people will revise their schemas to reflect
new information. But processing limits lead to a bias against revision: The normal
cognitive strategy is to construe information and events in such a way as to confirm
prior attitudes, beliefs, and impressions.”). This confirmatory bias, described in the
text as a cognitive bias, may have motivational bases as well. At the individual
level, revising a story causes anxiety, particularly if the revised story indicates that
prior beliefs were mistaken and/or that plans for the future should be revisited. Id.
at 136 (“Revising a schema is anxiety-provoking, especially if it opens up a host of
troubling possibilities.”). Accordingly, individuals may be unconsciously averse to
evaluating evidence in a way that calls on them to revise their own stories. With
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result in a “commitment” bias70 under which the managers strongly resist
evidence that previously selected courses of action were ill-chosen.71 The
upshot of the confirmatory and commitment biases, of course, is that
managers will tend to view new information as confirming prior beliefs and
the wisdom of past decisions – which means that they will tend to evaluate
new information optimistically.
b. Illusion of Control
A second optimism bias stems from the fact that managers officially
“control” corporate endeavors. There is substantial empirical support in the
psychology literature for the proposition that individuals systematically

respect to group decisionmaking (the sort that generally occurs in business
organizations), story revision is disfavored because of the threat it poses to group
cohesiveness. The need to revise a story implies that the group, or, more likely,
some portion thereof, was wrong in the past. Thus, group members will have to
undergo the stability-threatening process of assigning blame, reallocating
responsibilities, etc. Because they typically desire to avoid these stresses, group
members will unconsciously tend to construe information in a story-confirming
fashion. Id. at 138.
70

Professor Langevoort treats the confirmatory and commitment biases as different
biases. See id. at 135-38, 142. The distinction makes sense if the confirmatory bias
is viewed as a cognitive bias (designed to permit the decisionmaker to process large
volumes of information) and the commitment bias as a motivational bias (designed
to avoid the stresses and other negative effects associated with changing course).
See supra note 66(defining cognitive and motivational biases). As noted, however,
see supra note 69, and as recognized by Professor Langevoort, see Langevoort,
supra note 58, at 136, the confirmatory bias may be conceived of as a motivational
bias as well. So conceived, its resemblance to the commitment bias is striking. For
present purposes, then, it is sufficient to lump the biases together, for both manifest
themselves in a reluctance to change course and therefore result in a tendency to
view new information in a decision-confirming (i.e., optimistic) fashion.

71

See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with
Accountability: Conformity, Complexity and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989) (noting that subjects who committed themselves to
particular positions were more concerned with self-justification and engaged in less
self-criticism). The confirmatory and commitment biases may result in managers’
“throwing good money after bad.” For example, some scholars have argued that the
commitment bias is a primary cause of the chronic overcapacity that is common in
industry. See Edward J. Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots in Industry and
Competitor Analysis: Implications of Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic
Decisions, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 37, 45-47 (1991) (noting that firms may
irrationally escalate commitment to expand capacity).
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overrate their own abilities and achievements.72 And, of course, if people
overrate their own abilities, they will tend to over-estimate the likelihood
that decisions they made were “right” and will lead to desirable results.73
The implication in terms of managerial optimism should be clear: Managers
tend to believe they control their businesses’ affairs, and they therefore tend
to over-estimate their businesses’ prospects for success.74 Indeed, this bias
toward optimism is likely stronger in business organizations than elsewhere,
for optimists tend to be favored in the hiring process75 and in promotion
decisions.76
c. General Self-Serving Beliefs
Whereas self-aggrandizement is an indirect end of the confirmatory,
commitment and control biases,77 some patterns of inference pursue selfpromotion in a more general and direct fashion. The self-serving inference,
well-recognized by cognitive psychologists, manifests itself in a general
tendency to “see what one wants to see.”78 What one wants to see, of
72

Langevoort, supra note 58, at 139 (“One of the most robust findings in the
literature on individual decisionmaking is that of the systematic tendency of many
people to overrate their own abilities, contributions, and talents.”).

73

See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39
(3d ed. 1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers and summarizing
experiment in which a sample of people who expressed near total certainty that their
judgments were right (1000-to-1 odds) were in fact right only about 81% to 88% of
the time).
74

See J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance (Sept. 1997)
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=71411) (“[P]eople are more optimistic about
outcomes that they believe they can control. Consistent with this first experimental
finding, survey evidence indicates that managers underplay inherent uncertainty,
believing that they have large amounts of control over the firm’s performance.”)
75

See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 140 (noting that “[o]ptimists are prized in the
hiring process” and observing that numerous corporations utilize hiring tests
designed by a leading research psychologist to assess high levels optimism).

76

Id. (“[T]here is good reason to believe that the tournament-like competition for
promotion up the executive ladder overweights optimism and its associated
behavioral traits, inflating such behavior toward the top of the hierarchy.”).
77

Under the confirmatory and commitment biases, prior beliefs and decisions are
elevated, suggesting that the decision maker was wise in the past. The illusion of
control is manifested in beliefs that the decision maker controls things and does so
well and is therefore praiseworthy.

78

See Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential
Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 568 (1992) (analyzing “the notion that people are less
skeptical consumers of desirable than undesirable information”); THOMAS
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course, is something that is in her self-interest and is not threatening to her
self-esteem or career prospects.79 Thus, as Professor Langevoort explains,
“Management groups may subconsciously perceive information in a way, if
at all possible, that permits them to maintain consistency with their selfimage of efficacy and control, thereby justifying (to themselves and others)
preservation of their position and status.”80 This implies that management
will tend to ignore negative (price-decreasing) information or irrationally
spin it positively.
Taken together, the confirmatory/commitment, control, and general selfserving biases will tend to prevent even fully-informed managers from
accurately perceiving (and thus from accurately disclosing) price-decreasing
information.81
Perhaps more importantly, managers cannot reveal
information of which they are not aware. For reasons explained in the
following paragraphs, managers are less likely to be aware of pricedecreasing information than price-increasing information.
iii. Corporate Information Flow and Managerial
Ignorance
Much of the information concerning the success of a firm’s endeavors –
particularly non-quantifiable, “soft” information, such as the degree of
consumer enthusiasm for new products, the progress of products through the
research and development pipeline, etc. – is not immediately available to the
firm’s senior managers. Instead, the agents with the most direct access to
this information tend to be non-managerial employees and low- to mid-level
GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO 75-87, 76 (discussing the “tendency for
people to believe…what they want to believe”).
79

Langevoort, supra note 58, at 144.

80

Id.

81

One might wonder, of course, why market forces would not weed out those
corporations (or those managers) that tend toward false optimism. See Langevoort,
supra note 58, at 148 (“[S]hould we not expect those firms with unrealistic belief
systems that do not learn from their errors to disappear, leaving only those that have
successfully countered the problem of cognitive bias?”). Professor Langevoort
suggests that these managerial biases may persist, despite the competitive
environments in which businesses operate, because “punishment” of irrational firms
takes too long to provide effective discipline, id. at 151 (noting that “because of
variations in the intensity of competition, we cannot assume that firms with biasfilled cultures will necessarily die quickly” and that therefore “biases may persist
for unusually long periods of time”), and because the biases may be adaptive, id. at
152-56, 152 (“Put simply, there is reason to suspect that firms that inculcate certain
types of [optimistic] belief systems may in many settings be competitively superior
to those that are more doggedly ‘realistic.’”).
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managers.82 Senior managers, then, must rely on their underlings to provide
them with information regarding crucial aspects of the firm’s prospects.
The “upward” information flow from non-managerial employees and
middle-managers to top management poses a difficult problem for large
business organizations, which must devise means for ensuring orderly
information flow.83
The problem is that there is a danger at each stage of the informationrelay system that material information will be suppressed or exaggerated in
some fashion, as each information-provider will be tempted to tweak her
message to conform to her self-interest.84 Seeking promotion or other
rewards, she has an incentive to inform her superiors of every bit of valueenhancing information of which she is aware.85 By contrast, if she knows
her endeavors are not going as well as expected, she may positively spin that
information or keep it to herself in the hope that things will turn around
soon.86 By the time the price-affecting information reaches the senior
82

See, e.g., Jane E. Dutton, et al., Reading the Wind: How Idle Managers Assess the
Context for Selling Issues to Top Managers, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 407, 407
(1997) (“It is often middle managers rather than the top managers who have their
hands on the ‘pulse of the organization.’”).
83

See Manne, supra note 25, at 14 (“Top-level managers are regularly beset with
enormous problems of getting appropriate, truthful, and timely information for
making decisions.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 101314 (1998) (summarizing types of information-transmission problems corporate
managers confront); MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN
A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 118 (1987) (“Ideas relating to the…financial decisions of top
management…are likely to be processed as they make their way toward the top
managers of a firm.”); KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 33-43
(1974) (discussing difficulties of information flow within organizations).
84

See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 120 (“[I]f material information must pass
through a number of relay points in a hierarchy, the message can change (and lose
accuracy) in the process.”).

85

See id. at 121 (noting that “[c]ompensation is often subjective and set by the
immediate supervisor,” so that “the natural reporting temptation is to transmit
information in a way that minimizes the potential for blaming oneself for bad news,
and to convey as much good news as possible to the extent that the information can
be attributed to the source—consistent, of course, with a general desire to have a
reputation for credibility with one’s superiors”); Martha S. Feldman & James G.
March, Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171,
176 (1981) (“Information is gathered and communicated in a context of conflict of
interest and with consciousness of potential decision consequences. Often,
information is produced in order to persuade someone to do something.”).
86

The danger that underlings will keep negative information to themselves is
heightened in firms that have attempted to achieve orderly information flow by
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managers in charge of corporate disclosure, it is likely to have been
“massaged” so as to make underlings look good.87 In other words, it is
likely to be positively biased. Unaware of negative information, the senior
managers in charge of corporate disclosures can neither directly disclose the
bad news nor factor it into their more general forecasts.
iv. Difficulty of Correction
Even if corporate managers were as likely to perceive overvaluation as
undervaluation and were equally motivated to correct both forms of
mispricing, they would be more likely to correct undervaluation than
overvaluation because they have more effective means of doing so.
Consider a manager confronted with evidence that her company is
undervalued. She might issue a press release explaining why the market
was undervaluing her firm, or she could initiate a stock repurchase, thereby
signaling management’s strong belief that the stock is undervalued.88
Managers finding undervalued equity to be a chronic problem could adopt
equity
- based compensation schemes for executives (e.g., payment in stock
or stock options).89
A manager confronting overvalued equity, by contrast, is somewhat
strapped. As a practical matter, managerial candor is not an option, for a
manager who directly announced to the market that his corporation’s stock

instructing underlings to distinguish between the unusual and the usual and to limit
information flow to the former. See Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of
Managing, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1382, 1403 (describing the reporting rule of
“management by exception”). An underling who may choose which information is
unusual may exercise this discretion to suppress negative information.
87

See Dutton, et al., supra note 82, at 409 (observing that “people tend to
control…information about themselves that will affect others’ perceptions of
them”); R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. & Anthony Downs, A Theory of Large Managerial
Firms, 73 J. POL. ECON. 221, 236 (1965) (asserting that “[m]anagers are ‘economic
men’ who desire to maximize their own lifetime incomes” and that large firms
develop bureaucratic structures that “tend to…provide biased information to top
management which reflects its own desires and ideas too strongly”).
88

See Ok-rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J.
CORP. L. 425, 445 (2002) (“Since a stock buyback announcement signals
management’s information about their company’s undervaluation, the stock price
rises in response to revelation of this information.”).
89

Cf. John C. Coffee, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 275-76 (2004) (observing that
equity-based compensation, which grew as a percentage of the compensation of
CEOs of public corporations from five percent in 1990 to over sixty percent in
1999, “induce[s] management to obsess over their firm’s day-to-day share price”).
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was overpriced probably would not keep his job for very long.90 Nor could
the manager correct the mispricing by engaging in a sale transaction that
would send the reverse signal of a stock repurchase. Whereas the signal
sent by a stock buy-back is relatively unambiguous, a sale transaction
designed to signal overvaluation (e.g., an equity offering or a sale of
treasury shares the corporation previously purchased) is much noisier. It
could easily be interpreted as a means of raising capital for some sort of
corporate undertaking. And, of course, equity-based compensation, which
helps prevent undervaluation, exacerbates overvaluation by inducing
managers to drive the share price higher even when they know the company
is overvalued.91 Finally, the market for corporate control, which provides a
final stop-gap against undervaluation,92 cannot remedy overvaluation. As
Professor Jensen has observed, “[i]t is difficult, to say the least, to buy up an
overvalued company, eliminate its overvaluation, and make a profit.”93
Thus, there is an asymmetry in the degree to which managers and market
forces are able to correct the different species of mispricing: the primary
options available for correcting negative mispricing are not practically
available when the mispricing is in the positive direction.
b. Analysts Are Less Likely to Correct
Overvaluation.
Managers, of course, are not the only potential source of pricecorrecting information about a company whose stock is mispriced.
Professional stock analysts make a career out of discovering instances of
over- or undervaluation and advising their clients to trade accordingly.94
90

Professor Jensen contends that boards of directors would not take kindly to
managerial candor aimed at correcting overvaluation. He explains:
How could [a manager of an overvalued firm] argue to [his] board
that a major effort must be made to reduce the price of the stock?
In the last 10 years there has simply been no listening in boards
for this problem. The likely result for any CEO in this situation is
that the board would respond by saying: “If you cannot do it we
will get someone who can.”
See Jensen, supra note 1, at 10 (emphasis in original).

91

See id. at 14 (noting that “equity-based incentives are like throwing gasoline on a
fire – they make the problem [of overvaluation] worse, not better”).
92

Id. (observing that “[t]he market for corporate control solved many of the
problems of undervalued equity in the 1970s and 1980s through hostile takeovers,
leveraged buyouts, and management buyouts”).
93

Id.

94

All the major Wall Street brokerage firms and investment banks employ teams of
equity analysts, called “sell-side” analysts because they work for brokerage firms
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These highly-skilled analysts are afforded tremendous access to corporate
information and thus ought to be able to identify and inform the market of
overvaluation.95
Empirical evidence indicates, however, that analysts’ projections are
optimistically biased,96 and recent stock market events suggest that analysts
are not very effective at publicizing overvaluation. Consider, for example,
analysts’ treatment of Enron Corporation, whose bankruptcy on December
2, 2001 was at the time the largest ever.97 In the fall of 2001, each of the
fifteen largest Wall Street firms covering Enron’s stock had “buy”
recommendations in place.98 As late as October 26, 2001 – after Enron’s

rather than institutional clients such as mutual funds and hedge funds, who are
charged with monitoring the performance of major companies and reporting on their
potential investment value. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities
Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 98 (2005)
(describing role of sell-side analysts). The analysts make concrete and specific
investment recommendations for the stocks they cover. The most common rating
system involves five recommendations: “strong buy,” “buy,” “hold,” “sell,” and
“strong sell.” Id. at 98, n. 199.
95

See id. at 99 (“Wall Street equity analysts typically have numerous opportunities
to question management about their corporations, through quarterly management
conference calls, annual analyst meetings, and frequent interactions with the
corporation’s investor relations staff.”).
96

See, e.g., David Dreman & Michael Berry, Analyst Forecasting Errors and Their
Implications for Security Analysts, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30 (1995); Scott E. Stickel,
Predicting Individual Analyst Earnings Forecasts, 28 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 409
(1990). The optimism bias to which analysts are subject is vividly illustrated by
events that occurred at Merrill Lynch between 1999 and 2002. See Affidavit of Eric
R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business
Law Section 354 (April 2002) (affidavit of Assistant Attorney General of State of
New York in Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch et al., available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf). Without explanation, Merrill Lynch’s Internet
Research Group decided to stop issuing “reduce” and “sell” recommendations. Id.
at 8-10. Moreover, Merrill analysts issued highly positive recommendations on
stocks they were contemporaneously describing internally as “piece[s] of crap,”
“piece[s] of junk,” and “piece[s] of shit.” Id. at 13.
97

See The Largest Bankruptcies 1980–Present, available at http://www.
bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (visited July 21, 2005). Enron’s
bankruptcy was eventually eclipsed by that of Worldcom Inc. some eight months
later. See id.
98

STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG.,
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AT ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 34
(Comm. Print 2002). Professor John Coffee maintains that the analysts should have
known better:
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CFO had been forced to resign,99 the SEC had initiated an Enron
investigation,100 and the Wall Street Journal had run several stories about
Enron’s earnings management problems101 – ten of the fifteen largest Wall
Street firms covering Enron maintained buy recommendations,102 as did
fifteen of seventeen top Wall Street analysts surveyed by Thompson
Financial/First Call.103 And Enron was no outlier. Indeed, the ratio of
“buy” to “sell” recommendations has recently been as high as 100-to-1,104
and in the period immediately preceding a 60% drop in the NASDAQ, only
0.8% of analysts’ recommendations were “sell” or “strong sell.”105 Thus,
the evidence suggests that analysts, quick to report undervaluation by
issuing buy recommendations, are less responsive to mispricing in the
positive direction.

[A]s of December 31, 2000, Enron already had a stock price that
was seventy times earnings and six times its book value, and had
earned an 89% return for the year (despite a 9% decrease over the
same period for the S&P 500 index). Such a profile should have
alerted any analyst who was even half awake to the possibility
that Enron was seriously overvalued.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B. U. L. REV. 301, 316 (2004).
99

Enron CFO Andy Fastow was forced to resign from his position on October 24,
2001. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 377 (2003).
100

The SEC began an informal inquiry into Enron’s earnings management on
October 17, 2001. Enron publicly announced the informal probe on October 22,
2001, and its stock price immediately sank 20 percent. Id. at 371-72.

101

Beginning on October 17, 2001, the Wall Street Journal ran a series of articles
suggesting that Enron’s financial statements were misleading.
See John
Emshwiller, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big Loss, WALL ST. J. C1
(Oct. 17, 2001); Randall Smith, Partnership Spurs Enron Equity Cut, WALL ST. J.
C1 (Oct. 18, 2001); Rebecca Smith, Enron CFO’s Partnership Had Millions in
Profit, WALL ST. J. C1 (Oct. 19, 2001); Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, SEC
Seeks Information on Enron Dealings with Partnerships Recently Run by Fastow,
WALL ST. J. C1 (Oct. 23, 2001).
102

Kroger, supra note 94, at 102 & n. 213.

103

Susanne Craig & Jonathan Weil, Heard on the Street: Some Analysts Remain
Plugged Into Enron, WALL ST. J. C1 (Oct. 26, 2001).

104

Coffee, supra note 98, at 316-17.

105

Gene D’Avolio, Efi Gildor, & Andrei Shleifer, Technology, Information
Production, and Market Efficiency, Discussion Paper 1929, Harvard Inst. for
Economic Research, at 14 (Sept. 2001) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
286597).
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How could analysts fail so miserably in identifying and informing the
market of overvaluation? The most plausible answer is that stock analysts,
like corporate managers, face a set of incentives that systematically biases
them toward optimism.106 Most stock analysts are employed by firms that
make the lion’s share of their money by providing brokerage and investment
banking services.107 The brokerage side of those firms benefits when stocks
change hands, and optimistic “buy” recommendations, which may be acted
upon by a larger group of investors, are more likely to generate trading
activity than “sell” recommendations.108 More importantly, the more
106

In addition to these incentive-based biases toward optimism, analysts might
confront selection biases or cognitive biases that push them to view a company’s
prospects optimistically. Selection bias may be a problem if analysts follow only
stocks that they recommend and refrain from issuing forecasts on stocks they do not
like. See, e.g., Maureen McNichols & Patricia O’Brien, Self-Selection and Analyst
Coverage, 35 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 167 (1997) (finding that stock analysts add
coverage of stocks when their information is favorable and drop coverage when
their information is unfavorable). Cognitive bias may be a problem if an analyst
becomes too attached to a stock she covers, or too committed to a positive story she
once told about a then-hot stock. See Harrison Hong, Seeing Through the Seers of
Wall Street: Analysts’ Career Concerns and Biased Forecasts (Princeton Working
Paper, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~hhong/seers.pdf) (noting possibility
of selection and cognitive/behavioral biases but concluding that primary source of
analyst bias is career concern).
107

While there are “non-affiliated” analysts who have no relation with investment
banks, they play a relatively minor role in advising investors. Some have
questioned whether the market would support analysts if not for the role they played
in selling securities. Consider, for example, the remarks of David M. Becker, then
General Counsel of the SEC:
It’s also an open question in my mind whether the public wants to
pay what it costs to get analysts whose bias is beyond question.
Some independent research firms are thriving. Still, I would be
interested in finding out whether truly independent analysis is a
bit like legroom on an airplane. Everyone likes it; people
complain about the lack of it; but when push comes to shove there
aren’t that many people willing to pay for it.
David M. Becker, Analyzing Analysts, Remarks Before the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association (Aug. 7, 2001). See also
Kroger, supra note 94, at 103 (“There is, however, no real direct market for equity
research.”); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2003).
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One might initially think that any stock recommendation other than a “hold”
would benefit a firm’s brokerage business, for a negative recommendation (e.g.,
“strong sell”) would generate sales by customers who would utilize brokers.
Positive recommendations are more likely, however, to generate significant
brokerage income. Whereas a “buy” or “strong buy” recommendation can be acted
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lucrative investment banking side of a brokerage firm’s business109 benefits
from optimistic analyst reports.110
Issuers of securities want to make sure that the analysts employed by
their investment bank will drum up investor enthusiasm for the issue, so as
to command the highest price possible.111 They also want to ensure that the
analysts continue to support the stock after the offering so that it increases in
value.112 Managers thus carefully consider the optimism and enthusiasm of
upon by any investor, a “sell” or “strong sell” recommendation can be acted upon
only by individuals who currently own the stock at issue or are willing to engage in
a short sale or to purchase a put option. Because the latter group is significantly
smaller than the former, a positive recommendation is likely to generate more
trading activity, and thus more brokerage income, than a negative recommendation.
See Coffee, supra note 89, at 317 n. 43 (“[A] buy recommendation addresses the
entire market and certainly all the firm’s customers, while a sell recommendation
addresses only those customers who own the stock (probably well under one
percent) and those with margin accounts who are willing to sell the stock short.”).
Thus, analyst optimism will be favored by firms that have large brokerage
operations.
109

Income from brokerage operations is a small and apparently shrinking portion of
the business of most firms that employ analysts; the real money is in the investment
banking side of the business. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1046 (“Because
of the elimination of fixed commissions and intense competition in commission
levels, commission revenue currently reflects a relatively minor component of
brokerage-firm revenue. For most major firms, investment banking revenue is far
more significant.”).
110

See Kroger, supra note 94, at 103 (“[B]anks and brokers make money from
research indirectly, in two ways: research leads to increased equity transactions for
firm brokers, and it helps firm investment bankers sell their financial services to
major corporations.”).
111

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1047 (“The issuer wants coverage from the
analyst because a ‘rousing endorsement from a highly ranked analyst’ is believed to
send the stock of a ‘fledging’ company into ‘orbit.’”) (quoting Jeffrey M.
Laderman, Wall Street’s Spin Game, BUS. WK., Oct. 5, 1998, at 148); Becker, supra
note 107, at 3 (“To be most attractive to a potential underwriting client, an analyst
has to convince the client that he is enthusiastic about the issuer’s prospects and that
he can sow his enthusiasm among potential investors.”).
112

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1047 (“A firm also enhances the
attractiveness of its investment banking services if it can provide continued analyst
coverage that will help to maintain the price of the securities subsequent to the
offering.”). One might expect an issuer to be disappointed by post-offering price
appreciation, which would seem to imply that the offering price was set too low and
that the issuer was thus deprived of capital it might otherwise have raised.
Ironically, however, corporations tend to view offerings as successful if the postoffering stock price increases. See Stout, supra note 46, at 662 (“[A]necdotal
evidence suggests that management regards an initial public offering as ‘successful’
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an investment bank’s analysts in determining whom to hire. Indeed, CEOs
report that the reputation of the analyst covering the relevant industry is an
important determinant of their choice of an underwriter for their companies’
initial public and seasoned equity offerings.113 Analysts’ employers
therefore have an interest in assuring that their analysts issue rosy reports.114
Empirical evidence suggests that the employers have structured their
promotion and compensation schemes accordingly. Attempting to discover
whether analysts that issued optimistic predictions were rewarded with
better jobs or assignments, Professors Harrison Hong and Jeffrey Kubik
analyzed the earnings forecasts and employment histories of 12,000 analysts
working for 600 brokerage houses between the years of 1983 and 2000.115
They found that analysts were “systematically rewarded for being optimistic
as long as the optimism [was] within the range of accuracy that maintain[ed]
the credibility of the analysts.”116 They also found that relatively optimistic
analysts were much less likely to be fired or to leave a top brokerage house
and were much more likely to be hired by a better house.117 They were also
given better assignments than their more pessimistic (realistic?)
colleagues.118 For analysts covering stocks underwritten by their brokerage
houses, the connection between forecast accuracy and career advancement
was significantly more attenuated, and the dependence of career prospects
if the price of the issue in the aftermarket rises substantially above the offering
price.”). This reasoning may make sense if managers are issuing stock for reasons
other than simply to raise capital as cheaply as possible; they might, for example, be
more concerned with enhancing their or their firms’ status and prestige, with
creating a public market for insiders’ shares, or with increasing their firm’s ability
to acquire other businesses for stock instead of cash. Id. at 663.
113

See Hong, supra note 106, at 2-3.
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Thus, Morgan Stanley’s managing director of corporate finance famously stated
in an internal memorandum:
Our objective is . . . to adopt a policy, fully understood by the
entire Firm, including the Research Department, that we do not
make negative or controversial comments about our clients as a
matter of sound business practice. . . . Again, the philosophy and
practical result needs to be “no negative comments about our
clients.”

The Rohrbach Memo: “No Negative Comments,” WALL ST. J. (July 14, 1992) at
A6.
115

Harrison Hong & Jeffrey Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and
Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FIN. 313 (2003).
116

Hong, supra note 106, at 4 (summarizing the findings of Hong & Kubik (2003)).
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Id.
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Id.
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on forecast optimism was significantly larger.119 It thus seems that analysts’
personal incentives have been aligned with the incentives of their employers
– i.e., to issue enthusiastic and optimistic recommendations. Accordingly,
analysts cannot be counted on to provide investors with the “bad news”
necessary to correct instances of overvalued equity.120
2. Overvaluation Is More Harmful to Investors Than Is
Undervaluation.
Of course, it would matter little that managers and analysts are unlikely
to correct overvaluation, and thus the argument for liberalizing PDIT would
be weak, if overvaluation caused little harm to investors or to society in
general. And one might initially wonder how overvaluation could cause any
harm to investors, who generally want the market to value the stocks in their
portfolios as highly as possible. It is therefore useful to examine the harms
investors suffer as a result of stock mispricing. Such examination reveals
that equity overvaluation causes greater investor harm than equity
undervaluation.
a. Greater Allocative Inefficiency
Most commentators considering the costs of inaccurate stock prices
have focused on the allocative inefficiency caused by mispricing.121 In a
119

Id. at 5.
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It is no answer to say that the market will see through rosy analyst reports. As an
initial matter, the empirical evidence (although sparse) suggests that the market does
not see through these biased reports. Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict
of Interest and the Credibility of Underwrite Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV.
FIN. STUD. 653, 671-78 (1999) (providing empirical evidence suggesting that
market has failed to discount excessive analyst optimism). Perhaps this is because
the sophistication of the marginal investor is diminishing, see D’Aviolo, et al.,
supra note 105, at 2-3, which decreases the likelihood that bias will be recognized.
The market may eventually learn to discount analyst optimism (investor
sophistication can hardly diminish indefinitely), but at this point, the marginal
investor is apparently somewhat ignorant of the fact that analyst reports are biased.
Ultimately, though, whether the market will or will not see through rosy analyst
reports is irrelevant to the matter at hand. The point here is that analysts cannot be
counted upon to provide price-decreasing information to correct stock
overvaluation. Even if they do not exacerbate the problem (because the market
discounts what they are saying), they certainly do not help alleviate it.
121

See, e.g., Stout, supra note 46, at 640-41 (“Commentators who stop to address
the question [of why informationally efficient markets are desirable] generally
conclude that informational efficiency—which addresses only the market’s speed in
adjusting prices to new information—is desirable because it serves allocative
efficiency—the proper allocation of scarce resources among competing alternate
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market economy, decision makers look to prices in determining how to
allocate resources to their most highly valued uses.122 Inaccurate securities
prices are generally considered to be undesirable because they result in an
improper channeling of investment capital.123
While one might initially expect undervaluation and overvaluation to
create allocative inefficiencies of similar magnitude, overvaluation likely
causes greater allocative inefficiency than undervaluation. A firm whose
stock is undervalued can raise the capital it needs to fund expenditures by
tapping funding sources besides the equity markets.124 For example, it can
uses.” Id. at 640-41); David J. Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities
Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535, 539-42 (1988) (arguing that securities
prices are important because of their effect on allocative efficiency); John Coffee,
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA.
L. REV. 717, 734 (1984) (observing that securities prices are important “not so
much because of their distributive consequences on investors but because of their
effect on allocative efficiency”); Merritt Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated
Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1005, 1015 (1984) (noting benefits of accurate prices in efficient market);
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 866 (“The more accurately prices reflect
information, the better prices guide capital investment in the economy.”). But see
Stout, supra note 46, at 643-68 (arguing that benefits of efficient stock prices have
been overstated).
122

See F.A. Hayek, supra note 34, at 526 (discussing how the price mechanism
leads to an efficient allocation of resources throughout the economy).
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Consider an economy with two firms – one with high expected future earnings
and the other with the same assets but lower expected future earnings. More total
wealth will be created if money from investors is allocated to the former firm,
which will generate more value in the long run. If stock prices accurately reflect the
discounted expected value of each company’s future earnings, the stock of the
former company will be priced higher than that of the latter, and the former
company will raise more money than the latter by selling the same percentage of its
equity. Investment capital will therefore migrate in the right direction. If, however,
stock prices are inaccurate – say, a ten percent share of the former company is
priced the same as a ten percent share of the latter – then investment resources are
unlikely to be channeled to their highest and best use.
124

See Stout, supra note 46, at 645 (noting that “[c]orporations can finance their
projects through a number of means other than issuing stock,” including “internally
generated revenue” and “[a] host of forms of debt”). Professor Stout adds:
The argument that efficient stock markets are essential to allocate
properly investment capital assumes that, despite a plethora of
alternate financing sources, corporations rely primarily on stock
issues for raising funds. That assumption is at odds with actual
corporate financing behavior. In fact, firms largely appear to
avoid the stock market as a source of funding.
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raise money through corporate borrowing. While some have argued that the
corporation with a high and rising stock price can borrow more, and at a
lower cost of capital, than the corporation whose stock is declining,125 the
connection between stock price and borrowing ability seems tenuous.126
First, managers of firms with undervalued stock prices can explain to
lenders why their stock price is not reflective of future earnings. If they
have a compelling story, they should be able to borrow the funds they
need.127 Moreover, the banking literature indicates that lenders measure
loan risk – and thus determine the amount they are willing to lend and the
interest rate they will charge – by comparing the corporation’s outstanding
debt to the value of its assets, not the market price of its stock.128 In short,
managers of a firm whose stock is undervalued can and likely will correct
the problem with capital providers and will eventually get what they need,
albeit perhaps at a higher cost. By contrast, management of an overvalued
firm has no incentive to “correct” the mispricing when dealing with capital
providers, and empirical research (discussed below) indicates that managers
are more likely cause their firm to issue equity when it is overvalued.129
Thus, overvaluation may ultimately cause greater allocative inefficiency
than undervaluation.
This social cost of overvalued equity, though, is not much of a “harm”
to the shareholders of the mispriced firm. While society as a whole may be
worse off because of the allocative inefficiency resulting from a firm’s
overvaluation, that inefficiency results because the firm is able to raise more
money at a given cost than it ought to be able to raise.130 Any harm the
firm’s shareholders experience by virtue of the allocative inefficiency
Id. at 645-46.
125

See, e.g., WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
81 (1965); H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 123 (1979).
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See Stout, supra note 46, at 648-51 (arguing that stock prices play little influence
in decisions to extend credit).
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Id. at 649-50 (“The bank that readily lends on the basis of high share value
unsupported by assets or revenues is unlikely to stay in the banking business long.
Nor would rational lenders be deterred by depressed stock prices if the assets and
revenues to support the loan exist.”).
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See id. at 650 & n. 202 (citing numerous sources from banking literature).
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See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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Professors Carlton and Fischel recognized the flip-side of this assertion – i.e.,
that accurate stock prices are beneficial to society as a whole, but not necessarily to
individual firms or their investors. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 866-67
(“From the perspective of an individual firm, however, efficient capital markets are
a public good, unless private, as opposed to social, gains accrue to the firm when the
prices of its own securities convey accurate information.”).
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injected into the economy as a whole is dwarfed by the immediate benefit
they receive from the firm’s enhanced ability to raise capital.131 Thus,
concern about inefficient allocation of investment capital occasioned by
their firm’s overvaluation likely would not cause shareholders to value
protection from overvaluation.
But shareholders might value such protection, and pay a premium for it,
if overvaluation causes other costs that are concentrated more completely on
shareholders. That appears to be the case. Recent economic events suggest
that stock overvaluation causes at least three types of inefficiency that,
unlike the inefficient allocation of investment capital, are borne primarily by
the shareholders of an overvalued firm. First, overvaluation increases the
agency costs involved in running a corporation. In addition, it saddles
investors with expected reliance costs that tend to exceed the expected
reliance costs occasioned by equity undervaluation. Finally, it increases the
costsof monitoring managerial performance .
b. Greater Agency Costs
Agency costs are the costs that arise from cooperative effort by human
beings.132 They appear whenever any principal hires an agent to act on his
or her behalf, for the agent will always have an incentive to act
opportunistically or to shirk (which is, of course, a form of opportunism),
and the principal must therefore take steps to prevent or insure against such
behavior.133 Agency costs may thus be defined as the sum of the
contracting, monitoring, and bonding costs incurred to reduce the conflicts
of interest between principal and agent, plus the residual loss that occurs
because it is generally impossible to perfectly identify the interests of agents
and their principals.134 In a corporation, agency costs arise because the
directors, officers, and other managers charged with running the
corporation’s business have interests that conflict with the corporation’s
residual claimants, the shareholders.135 While capital markets generally
131

While this total benefit is smaller than the total cost associated with the firm’s
overvaluation, the shareholders capture all the benefit but externalize much of the
cost. Thus, their individual benefit from overvaluation likely exceeds, at least in the
short- term, the harm they suffer as participants in the larger economy.
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Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976)
(noting that “agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort”).
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Id. at 308.
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Id. at 308-09.
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See, e.g., David A. Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (1998) (“If the managers (the
agents of shareholders and the corporation) pursue their own interests—such as
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operate as a powerful tool for minimizing agency costs (because firms that
have developed effective mechanisms for lowering such costs will be most
attractive to investors),136 recent economic developments suggest that, when
equity becomes overvalued, securities markets tend to exacerbate agency
costs.137
A corporation’s expected agency costs are a function of two factors: the
likelihood that managers and investors will have divergent interests,138 and
the magnitude of investor loss that will result if managers put their own
interests ahead of investors’.139 Because (1) overvaluation is more likely
than undervaluation to cause managers’ interests to diverge from those of
investors and (2) the investor loss occasioned by managers’ pursuing their
own, rather than investors’, interests is likely to be greater when stock
mispricing is in the positive direction, overvaluation is likely to generate
significantly higher agency costs than undervaluation. To see this point,
compare undervalued and overvalued firms in terms of the likelihood of
divergence between managers’ and stockholders’ interests and the degree of
shareholder loss stemming from managerial opportunism.
i.

Agency Costs in the Undervalued Firm

When a firm’s equity is undervalued, the incentives of shareholders and
managers are likely to be closely aligned: Both groups will usually want to
increase stock price so that it reflects fundamental value. Shareholders will
desire this result because price appreciation adds to their long-term wealth140
leisure or perks, or their own prestige—rather than the interests of shareholders (the
principal), shareholders suffer the consequences.”).
136

Jensen, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that markets have been viewed as “potent
forces to help control agency costs”). Labor markets also help control agency costs,
for managers who do not pursue their own interests at shareholder expense will be
favored in the inter-firm competition for managerial talent.
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Id. (describing “how securities markets can sometimes create and exacerbate
conflicts of interest between managers and owner rather than resolve them”).
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The greater the likelihood of diverging interests, the greater the expected agency
costs.
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Acts of managerial opportunism differ in the degree to which they create loss for
investors. For example, a manager who violates his duty of loyalty by causing the
corporation to give $50,000 to a pet charity creates less investor loss (i.e., destroys
less corporate value) than a manager who causes the corporation to invest $50,000
in a firm that is developing a technology that will compete with that sold by the
investor corporation.
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Because the wealth accretion occurring when prices are brought up to the level
of actual value is not likely to diminish absent a change in the fundamental value of
the firm, the shareholder wealth effect here is long-term. Periods of equity
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and enhances the corporation’s overall health (and thus its value) by making
it easier for the firm to raise large sums of money in the capital markets.
Managers will typically want this result because (1) it is more prestigious to
run a company with a relatively high stock price than one with a relatively
low stock price,141 (2) their compensation frequently will be tied to stock
price,142 and (3) the corporation will be more flexible because it can use its
high-priced stock as currency or raise more money for expansion in the
capital markets.143 Given the overlap in shareholders’ and managers’
desires, it is unlikely that undervaluation will occasion any managerial
behavior that diverges from shareholder interests.
In the unlikely event managers were dissuaded from taking steps to
drive the stock price up to fundamental value,144 the investor loss resulting
from such opportunism would be relatively minor. Some loss could result if
the company had to forego investments because its depressed stock price

overvaluation, by contrast, enhance shareholder wealth only in the short-term. Such
transitory price enhancements are of little value to medium-term and long-term
stockholders. Short-term stockholders may benefit from transitory increases in
price, but only if they are able to time stock sales so that they sell at the temporarily
high price. In practice, this is rather difficult, for investors must avoid selling too
soon (prior to the peak) or too late (after the transitory price enhancement has
ended). Thus, transitory stock price increases offer little value to stockholders.
Enhancements that drive stock prices to the level of fundamental value, by contrast,
are not likely to be transitory and are desirable to all shareholders, regardless of the
length of time they intend to hold their stock.
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See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the prestige associated with managing a
company with a high stock price).
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See D’Avolio, et al., supra note 105, at 10 (noting growth in equity-based
compensation); Coffee, supra note 89, at 275-76 (same).
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Cf. Andre Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J.
FIN. ECON. 295, 309 (2003) (“The benefit of having a high valuation for making
acquisitions also points to an incentive to raise a firm’s stock price even through
earnings manipulation, a phenomenon whose presence is becoming increasingly
apparent.”).
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Shirking might prevent managers from taking affirmative steps to correct
undervalued stock prices. Or managers might want to keep stock prices depressed
below value if they had short-sold and needed to repurchase. Of course,
management short-selling is highly unlikely when a stock is undervalued. (For
many managers, it is illegal, see Securities Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. §
78p(c) (2005), and those managers for whom it is an option would not short a stock
if they knew its price was depressed below value.) Moreover, even managers that
had sold short would not want to keep the price depressed indefinitely; they would
desire the low price to remain for just long enough for them to repurchase the stock
at the depressed price.
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hampered its ability to raise money in the equity markets, but the company
could always pursue another form of financing and could likely negotiate a
favorable interest rate by explaining to lenders why the stock price was
artificially depressed.145 Investors would also experience loss in that their
portfolios would be undervalued during the period in which managers
opportunistically failed to correct the depressed stock price. Such periods,
however, would likely be short. Because undervaluation could usually be
corrected by the action of a single manager, managers would normally have
to work in concert to keep the stock price depressed. This coordinated
behavior would be unlikely to occur naturally, for most managers want to
avoid undervaluation,146 and persistent undervaluation would therefore
require some sort of collusion among managers (i.e., an agreement not to tell
the good news that would drive up the stock price). Any such cartel would
be inherently unstable, given the benefits that would likely accrue to a
cheater.147 Thus, any periods of investor wealth depression occasioned by
managers’ (improbable) failure to correct undervaluation are likely to be
transitory.
ii. Agency Costs in the Overvalued Firm
The situation is markedly different when a firm’s stock is overvalued.
Unlike undervaluation, overvaluation is likely to create a substantial
divergence in the interests of shareholders and managers, and the investor
loss that will result if managers of overvalued firms pursue their own
interests, rather than those of stockholders, is likely to be substantial.
a. Greater Divergence in Interests
When a firm’s stock price is overvalued, the interests of shareholders
and managers are likely to diverge. Managers are unlikely to prefer that the
stock price fall to fundamental value, for (as noted) they reap a host of
benefits from a high stock price.148 While most managers will realize that
overvaluation cannot last forever and that price correction is likely to occur
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See supra notes 126 - 128 and accompanying text. See generally Stout, supra
note 46, at 648-50.
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See supra notes 141 - 143 and accompanying text.
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Investors would love the cheater whose action corrected undervalued equity; the
press would heap praise upon her; the labor market would reward her with a host of
employment opportunities. If she were a stockholder or had equity-based
compensation, her wealth would increase.
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See supra notes 141 - 143 and accompanying text. As Professor Jensen has
observed, “If you’re the CEO or CFO [of an overvalued company], you’re on TV,
and covered by the press, investors love you, your options are increasing in value,
and the capital markets are wide open to your firm.” See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8.
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eventually,149 they may nonetheless refrain from taking steps to reduce price
to fundamental value. Their tendencies toward optimism150 will likely lead
them to believe either that they can eventually cause the firm to generate
cash flows that will justify the currently inflated price or that they will be
able to exit the corporation (by resigning their positions and selling their
stock) prior to the inevitable price correction.151 Thus, corporate managers
have little incentive to correct equity overvaluation.
On first glance, one might suppose that shareholders would similarly
desire for equity overvaluation to persist; after all, the higher the stock price,
the greater a shareholder’s wealth. Because overvaluation tends to be
eventually corrected, however, medium- to long-term shareholders generally
cannot capture the transitory wealth increase stemming from overvaluation
and thus will not care to extend periods of overvaluation.152 While shortterm shareholders may be able to profit from transitory periods of
overvaluation, they can do so only if they sell their stock prior to the
inevitable price correction. Such a “bail before correction” strategy is much
riskier for shareholders than for managers, for shareholders know little about
corporate events that may reveal overvaluation and are thus more likely to
delay too long before selling their stock. Moreover, shareholders possess
neither actual nor apparent control over the events likely to reveal
overvaluation and will thus tend to be less optimistic than managers about
their ability to sell their stock before the inevitable price-correction.153
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See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 106 (observing that “in most bad-news
scenarios, concealment simply delays the appreciation of the truth rather than avoids
it indefinitely”).
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See supra notes 66 - 71 and accompanying text.
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For example, accounts of the financial collapse at Enron suggest that the firm’s
managers, well aware of the corporation’s overvaluation, believed that they could
either turn the company around or exit before collapse. According to one prominent
account:
Enron’s accounting games were never meant to last forever….
The goal was to maintain the impression that Enron was humming
until [CEO Jeff] Skilling’s next big idea kicked in and started
raking in real profits…. In Skilling’s mind, though, there was no
way he was going to fail. He had always succeeded before, and
his success had transformed the company. Why would it be any
different with EES and broadband?
McClean & Elkind, supra note 99, at 171.
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See supra note 140.
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On the optimistic biases created by actual or apparent control over events, see
supra notes 72 - 76 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, even short-term stockholders will value periods of
overvaluation less than managers will.
In addition, any “upside” experienced by shareholders during periods of
overvaluation is likely to be counteracted by a significant downside. For
reasons detailed in the following paragraphs, managers are likely during
periods of equity overvaluation to engage in behavior that destroys real
corporate value. Given this probability, stockholders are even more likely to
prefer that managers correct equity overvaluation.
b. Greater Investor Losses From
Managerial Opportunism
Whereas the investor losses stemming from a managerial failure to
correct undervalued equity are likely to be small,154 the losses occasioned by
equity overvaluation may be significant.
In essence, managers of
overvalued firms are “buying time” – hoping to trick the market into
maintaining the high stock price until they can exit the firm (both as
shareholders and as managers) or can produce the corporate performance
required to justify the stock price.155 Such continued trickery requires
beating analysts’ expectations, for the capital markets routinely punish firms
that fail to meet such expectations.156 Indeed, one recent study found that
the average stock price of firms beating consensus analyst forecasts for the
quarter rose 5.5% more during the quarter than a size-matched portfolio; by
contrast, the average stock price of firms missing consensus expectations
fell by 5.04% more during the quarter than a size-matched portfolio.157 It is
therefore crucial that managers of an overvalued firm continue to meet or
beat analysts’ expectations. The problem, of course, is that they cannot
perpetually do so by exploiting legitimate value-creating opportunities.158
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See supra notes 144 - 147 and accompanying text.
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See Jensen, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that objective of managers of overvalued
firm is to “postpone the day of reckoning until [they] are gone or [they] figure out
how to resolve the issue”). See also supra note 151.
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See id. at 7 (observing that “CEOs and CFOs know that the capital markets will
punish the entire firm if they miss analysts’ forecasts by as much as a penny” and
that “the capital markets reward a firm with a premium for meeting or beating the
analysts’ expectations during the quarter”).
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Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth
Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your
Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCTG. STUD. 289, 297 (2002) (Table I).
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See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7 (“Generally, the only way for managers to meet
those expectations year in and year out is to cook their numbers to mask the
inherent uncertainty in their businesses. And that cannot be done without
sacrificing value.”).
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Once those options have been exhausted, they will eventually turn to
gimmicks that are designed to produce numbers that appease the market but
actually reduce long-term firm value.159
Professor Jensen has identified three such gimmicks that are routinely
pursued by managers of overvalued firms:
To appear to be satisfying growth expectations you use your
overvalued equity to make long run value destroying
acquisitions; you use your access to cheap debt and equity
capital to engage in excessive internal spending and risky
negative net present value investments that the market
thinks will generate value; and eventually you turn to
further accounting manipulation and even fraudulent
practices to continue the appearance of growth and value
creation.160
Consider how these three gimmicks work in concert to destroy corporate
value.
(i) Value-Destroying Acquisitions
Because corporate acquisitions create the appearance of growth (and
thus may fool the market for at least a while), corporate managers that have
exhausted other growth options may find such acquisitions attractive, even if
they are ultimately value-reducing. The findings of a recent study by
Professors Sara Moeller, Frederick P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz are
consistent with the claim that equity overvaluation leads managers to pursue
value-destroying acquisitions.161 The authors compared how merger
announcements affected the stock prices of acquiring firms during the 19982001 period, a period of significant equity overvaluation, with the acquiringfirm price effects occasioned by merger announcements in the 1980s. They
found that, for the 1998-2001 period, the value of acquiring firms declined
by a total of $240 billion in the three-day periods surrounding
announcements of acquisitions.162 During all of the 1980s, by contrast, the
159

See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8-9 (“You realize the markets will hammer you
unless your company’s performance justifies the stock price. So after all value
creating alternatives have been taken you start to take actions that destroy long run
value that you hope will at least appear to generate the market’s expected
performance in the short run.”).
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Id. at 6-7.
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Sara Moeller, Frederick P. Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction
on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger
Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 (2005).
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Id. at 758-59.
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loss in value of acquiring firms during the three-day period surrounding
merger announcements was only $4.2 billion.163 Moreover, whereas the
acquirers’ losses in the 1980s were offset by gains to acquirees, for a net
synergy gain of $11.6 billion, such an offset did not occur in the 1998-2001
period; rather, the losses to acquirers exceeded acquirees’ gains for a net
synergy loss of $134 billion.164
Equity overvaluation seems to have influenced this value destruction.
The authors found that most of the value losses were attributable to 87
“large loss” transactions, in which the loss to each acquiring firm exceeded
$1 billion.165 The bidders in those transactions appear to have been
overvalued: They had statistically significantly higher Tobin’s q and
market-to-book ratios (both proxies for overvaluation)166 than both the
bidders in other deals during the same time period and all bidders in the
period from 1980-97.167 Moreover, a substantially greater proportion of
bidders in large loss deals financed their acquisitions using equity: 71.6% of
the bidders in large loss deals did so, as opposed to 35.2% of other bidders
during the same time period and 30.3% of all bidders in the 1980-97
period.168 In short, what the authors term “wealth destruction on a massive
scale” appears to have occurred because overvalued bidders used their highpriced stock to finance deals that, from investors’ perspective, should not
have been pursued.169 Such findings are consistent with Professor Jensen’s
assertion that equity overvaluation leads to unwise acquisitions that are
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Id. at 758, 762 (Table I).
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Id. at 762 (Table I).
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Id. at 759. The total loss to the bidders’ shareholders in these transactions was
$397 billion, which represented a cumulative abnormal return of -10.6%. Id. The
average loss to acquiring-firm shareholders was $2.31 per dollar spent on the
acquisition. Id. at 765.
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Tobin’s q is, in essence, the market value of a firm’s assets divided by the
replacement value of those assets. Brealey & Myers, supra note 41, at 775.
Obviously, the higher this figure, the more overvalued the firm is. Market to book
ratio is the market value of a firm’s assets divided by the book value of those assets.
Id. at 774-75. Again, the higher this figure, the more highly valued is the firm as a
going concern.
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Moeller et al., supra note 161, at 773 (Table III).
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See also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 143 (providing model consistent with
observation that overvalued firms engage in enhanced merger activities that produce
negative long-run returns).

40

designed to dupe the market but will ultimately be revealed, to the detriment
of shareholders.170
(ii)

Negative NPV Greenfield
Investments and Avoidance of
Positive NPV Investments

Equity overvaluation also tends to lead managers to reduce firm value
by pursuing certain greenfield investments that have a negative net present
value (NPV) and avoiding other investments that have a positive NPV
. 171
As explained below, this occurs because overvaluation effectively provides
managers with additional capital to invest in enterprise expansion,172 and,
since managers receive private benefits from expansion, they will tend to do
so beyond the point that is optimal for shareholders (i.e., the point at which
the firm’s value is maximized).173 Moreover, a relatively high stock price
tends to make marginal investment opportunities appear more valuable than
170

Professor Jensen explains:
The evidence is consistent with the argument…[that] management
makes acquisitions to con the market into believing that
management is going to create the value that the market expects,
and is able to continue to fool it for some period of time by
providing the illusion of growth. When the market finds out that
the high value and growth was an illusion the firm’s value falls
precipitously because all the overvaluation will disappear as well
as the value of the core business that has been compromised by
the attempts to avoid discovery.

Jensen, supra note 1, at 11, 13. While Professor Jensen concedes that the data are
“also consistent with the hypothesis that the earlier acquisitions [i.e., those
occurring prior to the large loss deal] truly created value,” id. at 13, and
acknowledges that “[a]dditional work must be done to sort this issue out,” id., he
points to the case of Nortel Corporation as suggesting that acquisitions by
overvalued firms prior to a large loss deal are similarly wealth-destructive in the
long run and that the large loss deal simply tips the market off to the acquirer’s
overvaluation. Id.
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“Greenfield investments” refers to investments in new projects, as opposed to
acquisitions of existing enterprises. A manager seeking to maximize the value of
her firm (and thus shareholder wealth) should pursue all those projects where the
discounted present value of expected project returns exceeds the discounted present
value of the expenses associated with pursuit of the project. Such a project would
have a “positive NPV.” By contrast, managers seeking to maximize shareholder
wealth should avoid any “negative NPV” project – i.e., a project where the
discounted present value of expected returns is less than the discounted present
value of the project’s expenses. See Brealey & Myers, supra note 41, at 85-106.
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See infra notes 183 - 187 and accompanying text.
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they actually are, furthering the possibility that they will be pursued by
management.174 Once managers begin a “growth strategy” of acquisitions
and internal investments, they find that such a strategy is difficult to alter;
they therefore tend to sacrifice firm value by pursuing the growth strategy
for too long.175 Finally, because managers of overvalued firms live in
constant fear of discovery by the securities markets,176 they will forego
positive NPV projects that may temporarily reduce earnings per share.177
Consider how these forces work together to reduce firm value.
More money to invest. When equity is overvalued, firm managers
effectively have more capital to invest. Most obviously, they may pay for
expenses using their firm’s inflated stock as currency. In addition, they can
raise more actual cash by issuing new equity at prices reflecting their firm’s
overvaluation. Empirical data on the issuance of equity indicate that
managers do, in fact, take advantage of periods of overvaluation by issuing
equity.178 Moreover, managers admit to such behavior in anonymous
surveys. Professors John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, for example,
found that two-thirds of CFOs agree that “the amount by which our stock is
undervalued or overvalued by the market” is an important or very important
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See infra notes 188 - 196 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 197 - 200 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 155 - 157 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 202- 204 and accompanying text.
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See Malcolm P. Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Market Timing and Capital Structure,
57 J. FIN. 1, __ (2002) (noting that “analyses of actual financing decisions show that
firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when market value is high, relative to book
value and past market values, and tend to repurchase equity when market value is
low”). Professors Baker and Wurgler note that numerous studies have observed a
coincidence of seasoned equity issues and high stock prices. Id. at __, n. 1 (citing
Robert A. Taggart, A Model of Corporate Financing Decisions, 32 J. FIN. 1467
(1977); Paul Marsh, The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study, 37
J. FIN. 121 (1982); Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Equity Issues and Offering
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Issues, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 685 (1991); Kooyul Jung, Cheol Kim Yong, and Rene M.
Stulz, Timing, Investment Opportunities, Managerial Discretion, and the Security
Issue Decision, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (1996); and Armen Hovakimian, Tim Opler, &
Sheridan Titman, The Debt-Equity Choice, 36 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1 (2001)).
Similarly, they note, studies observe a coincidence of high valuations and initial
public offerings. Id. (citing Tim Loughran, Jay Ritter, & Kristian Rydqvist, Initial
Public Offerings: International Insights, 2 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 165 (1994) and
Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, & Luigi Zingales, Why Do Companies Go Public?
An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27 (1998)).
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consideration in deciding to issue equity.179 Nearly as many (62.6%) agreed
that “if our stock has recently risen, the price at which we can sell is
‘high.’”180 CFOs further reported that equity market prices were the second
most important of thirteen factors normally considered in determining
whether to issue common stock,181 and was the second most important of
eight factors normally considered in determining whether to issue
convertible debt.182 Equity overvaluation is therefore likely to increase the
resources with which managers may pursue firm expansion.
Incentives to over-invest. This easy access to investment resources
causes a version of what Professor Jensen has termed the “agency costs of
free cash flow,”183 for managers with the resources to do so are likely to
pursue firm expansion beyond the point that is optimal for stockholders.
Whereas the rational stockholder desires the firm to expand to the point at
which its marginal cost of expansion equals the marginal value added to the
firm because of such expansion,184 managers will tend to seek expansion to
the point at which their private marginal benefits occasioned by the
expansion equal their marginal cost of seeking that level of expansion
(including, of course, the cost of any “punishment” they expect to receive
because they have pursued expansion excessively). The problem arises
because managers’ personal marginal costs and benefits from expansion are
not strictly proportionate to the total costs and benefits created by the
179

John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate
Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 216 (2001) (Table 8).
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Id.
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CFOs ranked market price a more important factor in determining whether to
issue common stock than “providing shares to employee bonus/stock option plans”;
“maintaining a target debt-to-equity ratio”; “diluting the holdings of certain
stockholders”; “stock is our ‘least risky’ source of funds”; “whether our recent
profits have been sufficient to fund our activities”; “using a similar amount of
equity as is used by other firms in our industry”; “issuing stock gives investors a
better impression of our firm’s prospects than issuing debt”; “inability to obtain
funds using debt, convertibles, or other sources”; “common stock is our cheapest
source of funds”; and “the capital gains tax rates faced by our investors (relative to
tax rates on dividends).” Id. at Table 8. The only commonly considered factor
deemed more important than a high market price was concern about earnings per
share dilution. Id.
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Id. at 221 (Table 10).
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See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
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Because marginal costs of expansion tend to rise as expansion continues, and
marginal benefits tend to fall, expansion beyond the point at which marginal costs
equal marginal benefits reduces firm value.
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expansion. Specifically, managers receive a disproportionately large share
of the benefits of firm expansion.185 All else being equal, managers of
bigger firms are better off than managers of smaller firms—for example,
their job prestige grows, they have more resources under their control, and
their compensation often increases (as managerial compensation is
frequently related to sales volume).186 In addition, managers often have an
interest in firm expansion as a means of providing new employment
positions, for firms often reward middle managers with promotion rather
than year-to-year bonuses.187 Thus, rational, self-interested managers will
pursue a level of investment that is excessive in that it fails to maximize
firm value.
Skewed perceptions of likely project success. In addition to the “supply
side” effect whereby managers engage in a greater number of negative NPV
projects because they have access to the funds with which to do so,
overvaluation may have a “demand side” effect: It may make proposed
projects look more profitable and may therefore cause managers to believe
that negative NPV projects are actually positive NPV projects. Professors
Christopher Polk and Paola Sapienza have recently provided empirical
evidence consistent with this observation.188
The research by Professors Polk and Sapienza builds on a prior study by
Professor Jeremy Stein, who showed that stock price valuations affect firm
investment through an “equity-issuance” channel.189 Professor Stein
demonstrated that equity-dependent firms (i.e., those lacking ample access
to cash and/or debt) would base investment decisions on their stock price,
foregoing positive NPV investments when the price was low and the amount
of capital that could be raised in a stock issuance was relatively small.190
The upshot of Professor Stein’s findings was that higher stock prices would
“enable good (i.e., positive net present value) projects that otherwise would
not occur.”191 Professors Polk and Sapienza asked a follow-up question:
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Could stock price misvaluation affect firm investment decisions through a
“catering channel” as well as an “equity-issuance” channel, so that higher
stock prices increase the level of investment by firms that are not equitydependent?192 They theorized that managers expand firm investment when
stock prices are high because they evaluate proposed projects according to
current stock price levels. Managers may, for example, posit multiples by
which proposed projects will increase stock prices, thereby causing
proposed projects to appear more desirable the higher current stock price
is.193 If that is the case, then one would expect to find both that investment
levels increased as stock prices rose and that increased investment was
associated with lower returns (indicating that the increased investment was
not merely the result of equity-dependent firms’ enhanced ability to pursue
positive NPV projects).
Professors Polk and Sapienza found both correlations. Adjusting for
investment opportunities, they found that firms with overpriced stock tended
to engage in more investment.194 In addition, they found that firms which
engaged in higher levels of investment experienced relatively lower stock
returns.195 These findings suggest that higher equity prices do not simply
enable firms to pursue a greater number of positive NPV investments;
instead, they cause investment to expand to include negative NPV projects.
192

Id.
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Id. Professors Polk and Sapienza explain:
If new investment projects are evaluated at the current stock
market price, for example as in the practice of using “multiples”
to evaluate new projects, and if there is enough asymmetry of
information regarding project quality, a rational manager may find
it optimal to invest in projects with negative NPV even when the
project is not financed with equity issues. Firms with ample cash
or debt capacity may have an incentive to waste resources when
their stock price is overpriced and to forgo positive investment
opportunities when their stock price is undervalued. Thus
mispricing may affect investment without working through an
equity channel ….

Id. (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 5. Polk and Sapienza utilized three well-established proxies for
overvaluation: high discretionary accruals, high net equity issuances, and price
momentum. See id. at 4-5 (discussing why these metrics are fair proxies for
overvaluation). Adjusting for investment opportunities, the authors found “a
positive relation between all of these three mispricing proxies and firm investment.”
Id. at 5.
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Id. at 6 (“We find that firms with high (low) investment have low (high) stock
returns, after controlling for investment opportunities and other characteristics
leading to return predictability.”).
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That finding is consistent with the authors’ theory that managers evaluate
project proposals according to current stock price levels.196 If, indeed, they
do so, then overvaluation will lead to further investor loss by causing
managers to overestimate the value of proposed projects.
The “stickiness” of a growth strategy. Acquisitions and internal
investments represent “growth” strategies for firms. Recent research
suggests that once corporate managers set a firm on this sort of growth
course, that course can be difficult to reverse, and value-destruction may
result.197 Professors Philippe Aghion and Jeremy Stein observe that
constraints on firms’ resources, particularly on managers’ time, force firms
to decide between increasing sales growth (i.e., pursuing a growth strategy)
and improving profit margins (by, for example, lowering per unit costs).198
Investors, then, evaluate the firm’s performance and prospects according to
whether its managers have chosen a growth or margins strategy, altering
their performance measures depending on the strategy management has
selected.199 In particular, if the market believes a firm is pursuing a growth
strategy, its valuation will tend to put more weight on realized growth. That
will, in turn, encourage managers to stick with the growth strategy so as to
avoid disappointing the market. Only when the growth strategy becomes
severely inefficient will managers shift to a cost-cutting strategy.200 Thus,
decisions to pursue growth strategies are “sticky.” Managers who adopt
such strategies in an attempt to bolster stock price or keep an inflated stock
price from declining will tend to pursue such strategies too long – i.e., to the
point at which they are sacrificing firm value.
Avoidance of positive NPV projects . In addition to causing active value
destruction through unwise acquisitions and greenfield investments,
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See supra note 193. Of course, it is also consistent with managers’ acting in a
consciously opportunistic fashion and pursuing projects they believe to have a
negative NPV simply because such projects promise them personal benefits.
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Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth vs. Margins: Destabilizing
Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants (Dec. 5, 2004), NBER
Working Paper No. W10999 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=637496).
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Id. at 1 (“[D]oing more on one dimension [i.e., either growth or margins]
necessarily implies doing less on the other.”). Other scholars have similarly
recognized that managers face this sort of “multi-tasking” problem. See, e.g., Bengt
Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991).
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Aghion & Stein, supra note 197, at 1 (citing Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein,
Simple Forecasts and Paradigm Shifts, Harv. Univ. Working Paper (2004)
(demonstrating how this sort of emphasis shift occurred in analysts’ reports on
Amazon.com)).
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Id. at 2-3.
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overvaluation may cause passive value destruction by encouraging
managers to forego positive NPV projects. Because the dominant strategy
of managers of overvalued firms is, in the words of Professor Jensen, to
“postpone the day of reckoning until [they] are gone or [they] figure out
how to resolve the issue,”201 they will look for opportunities to conceal their
firm’s overvaluation from the market. One way to do so is to delay
investment expenditures in order to meet quarterly earnings expectations
and avoid the value reassessment that accompanies missing such an
expectation.202 Accordingly, many managers will delay positive NPV
investments – even where such a delay entails a sacrifice in firm value – in
an attempt to dupe the market.
Recent research suggests that this sort of value-sacrificing behavior is
widespread. In their 2004 survey of 401 corporate CFOs, Professors John
R. Graham, Campbell Harvey, and Shivaram Rajgopal posed the following
question: “Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your company might
come in below the desired earnings target. Within what is permitted by
GAAP, which of the following choices might your company make?”203
Eighty percent of respondents stated that their companies would be willing
to delay discretionary expenditures on research and development,
advertising, and maintenance, and over 55 percent stated that their company
would “[d]elay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in
value.”204 Overvaluation thus tends to cause passive value destruction as
managers attempt to buy time by delaying positive NPV investments.
(iii) Eventual Fraud
Once managers of overvalued firms have exhausted their opportunities to
boost or maintain apparent firm value through acquisitions and greenfield
investments, they face a temptation to pursue more direct means of duping
the market. They may begin with “earnings management,” the well-accepted
practice of smoothing earnings by strategically timing the recognition of
201

Jensen, supra note 1, at 10. See also supra notes 155 - 159 and accompanying
text (discussing objectives of managers of overvalued firms).
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See supra notes 156 - 157 and accompanying text (discussing stock price effects
of earnings surprises).
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John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, The Economic
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting at Table 6 (available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=491627).
204

Id. Around 40 percent of respondents stated that they would “[b]ook revenues
now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter).” Id. This result is
consistent with the view that earnings management is being used to dupe the market
to prevent discovery of overvaluation. See infra notes 205 - 207 and accompanying
text.
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revenues and expenses in order to meet market projections.205 Indeed,
around 40 percent of the CFOs surveyed by Professors Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal reported that they would “book revenues now rather than next
quarter” if their company were in danger of missing an earnings target.206
Some scholars have argued that earnings management is itself fraudulent.207
Even if it is not, though, it tends to evolve rapidly into outright fraud, for
managers who recognize revenues early and push recognition of expenses
into the future will face more difficult accounting challenges in subsequent
quarters and will eventually have no choice but to lie or have their company
be discovered as overvalued.208
It should be obvious that accounting manipulation will create significant
agency costs for a firm. In the likely event that a firm’s accounting
manipulations are revealed, the firm’s reputation for honesty and candor will
be damaged. Such a reputation is, of course, essential to a successful firm:
When a company’s managers are less than forthright, customers will be less
willing to do business with the firm; compliance costs will rise as regulators
monitor the firm more closely; potential business partners will be less
willing to embark on joint ventures; lenders will be less likely to extend
credit on favorable terms; and investors will invest their money elsewhere
(or demand a higher return on investment). Accounting manipulations thus
make it hard for a company to flourish and, in extreme cases, may kill the
company altogether.209 Thus, the agency costs created by accounting
205

See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7-8 (describing earnings management and noting that
it “has been considered an integral part of every top manager’s job for at least the
last two decades”).
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Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, supra note 203, at Table 6.
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For example, Professor Jensen argues:
[W]hen managers smooth earnings to meet market projections,
they’re not creating value for the firm; they’re both lying and
making poor decisions that destroy value. . . . [W]hen numbers
are manipulated to tell the markets what they want to hear (or
what managers want them to hear) rather than the true status of
the firm—it is lying, and when real operating decisions that would
maximize value are compromised to meet market expectations
real long-term value is being destroyed.

Jensen, supra note 1, at 8.
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Id. (“Revenues borrowed from the future and today’s expenses pushed to
tomorrow require even more manipulation in the future to forestall the day of
reckoning.”).
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Enron represents perhaps the most striking recent example of this process. See
generally McLean & Elkind, supra note 99; MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS,
POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003). Valued at
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manipulation, which overvalued equity encourages as a means of buying
time, are potentially huge.
c. Greater Reliance Costs
In addition to imposing greater agency costs than undervaluation, equity
overvaluation is likely to cause investors to suffer greater “reliance” losses.
To see this point, consider two hypothetical cases of misrepresentation.210
In one case, a credible source informs the victim (Victim A) that her savings
are worth 25% less than they are actually worth. In the second, the victim
(Victim B) is told that her savings are worth 25% more than they actually
are. In both cases, the truth is revealed one year after the misrepresentation
is made. Who is likely to suffer greater damages—Victim A or Victim B?
To answer this question, consider the two victims’ likely courses of
action. Victim A, misinformed that her savings are undervalued, will likely
save more (i.e., divert income from current consumption to savings), and/or
move her invested funds, which she believes are not adequately
appreciating, into what she deems to be the next best investments.211 Her
its peak at around $70 billion, Enron was actually worth around $30 billion – still a
significant amount by anyone’s standards. Jensen, supra note 1, at 10-11. Through
accounting manipulations aimed at disguising this degree of overvaluation,
however, Enron’s managers impaired the company’s reputation and, in the process,
destroyed its value. Id. at 11. As Professor Jensen explains:
[S]enior managers’ efforts to defend the $40 billion of excess
valuation (which was a mistake that was going to go away
anyway) effectively destroyed the $30 billion core value. …
[Enron’s managers] destroyed [the company] by trying to fool the
markets through accounting manipulations, hiding debt through
off-balance sheet partnerships, and over hyped new ventures such
as their broadband futures effort. In doing this, Enron’s managers
gambled with their critical asset – Enron’s reputation for integrity.
Id.
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The misrepresentation could be either fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
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Above minimal income levels, individuals tend not to spend their entire incomes
on immediate consumption; instead, they set a portion aside in the form of savings
to pay for future consumption. See Stout, supra note 46, at 682. In allocating their
income, they attempt to achieve an optimal balance between present and future
consumption. Their decisions regarding how much to save and where to invest are
influenced by their current investment portfolio. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
NYU L. REV. 761, 767 (1985) (observing that “[c]apital markets facilitate
individual planning of consumption over time in light of anticipated resources” and
that they “guide investment and saving decisions through prices”). If an investor
believes his portfolio is worth less than it is, he’ll tend to divert too much money
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damage occasioned by the misrepresentation will thus consist of (1) her net
utility loss from foregoing current consumption to save instead, plus (2) the
difference between her “second best” investment returns and the returns she
would have received had she not moved her invested funds. Victim B, led
to believe that she’s richer than she really is, will likely save less and
consume more. If her impressive returns lead her to save more, she will
likely invest in the same investments currently in her purportedly, but not
actually, high-performing portfolio. Indeed, this pattern of increased
consumption and re-investment in apparently appreciating enterprises
occurred all too often during the technology bubble of the late 1990s.
While it is impossible to say, without more facts, whether Victim A or
Victim B is hurt to a greater degree, the stronger intuition seems to be that
Victim B (the one misinformed that her savings were worth more than they
are) would probably suffer greater harm in the long run. Individuals
normally allocate their resources according to expected marginal utility.
Their first resources are devoted to basic necessities (e.g., food and shelter),
then they typically save for the future, then whatever is left over is spent on
luxuries (e.g., consumption of non-necessities, charitable contributions,
etc.).212 As they move from necessities to luxuries, their expenditures tend
to produce less incremental utility. A person who is misinformed that she’s
wealthier than she really is will tend to shift from investment spending to
luxury spending too quickly, thereby allocating her resources in a manner
that fails to maximize her expected utility. It thus appears that the reliance
losses occasioned by equity overvaluation (a misrepresentation that one is
richer than one really is), are greater than those occasioned by equity
undervaluation. Investors may therefore place a premium on corporate
policies that reduce the risk of overvaluation.
d. Greater Impairment of Stock Price as a
Managerial Monitoring Tool
Corporate managers who fail to increase firm value frequently are, and
should be, replaced. The decision to replace incumbent managers is
generally initiated by the board of directors or by large shareholders (e.g.,
institutional investors). Because information regarding the performance of
toward savings and away from current consumption. He may also divert money
from the undervalued security into other investments. If the investor believes his
portfolio is worth more than it is, he’ll tend to divert money away from savings and
toward current consumption. See id. at 767-68. But see Stout, supra note 46, at
682-84 (arguing that efficient securities prices are not that important to investors
deciding how to allocate their money).
212

Cf. Stout, supra note 46, at 682 (discussing how individuals tend to allocate
financial resources as their income grows).
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managers is costly to obtain (particularly in large enterprises in which the
relevant information is possessed by numerous employees scattered
throughout the firm),213 directors and large shareholders rationally seek out
proxies for managerial performance. Stock price reflects the discounted
present value of the firm’s future cash flows214 and is therefore a good,
though admittedly imperfect, proxy.215
Stock mispricing obviously thwarts the effectiveness of this monitoring
tool.216 If stock is undervalued, directors and institutional shareholders will
be too quick to replace incumbent management, and if stock is overvalued,
directors and large shareholders may fail to seek replacement when they
ought to do so. Both forms of mispricing therefore increase the difficulty of
monitoring managers.
But the degree to which mispricing thwarts effective managerial
monitoring is likely to be greater when stocks are mispriced upward than
when the mispricing is in a downward direction. If the directors of a
corporation decide to replace an incumbent manager upon observing a stock
price that appears to be too low, the manager can plead her case to the
board, explaining why the stock price is temporarily depressed and will
eventually rebound. If, for example, management is concealing priceenhancing information for strategic purposes (as in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur), the manager will generally explain that fact to the board or
institutional investors.217 Thus, the board and institutional investors are
likely to learn of mispricing in a downward direction before they make a
poor staffing decision. On the other hand, if the stock is overvalued because
of undisclosed information, there will likely be no opportunity for the
213

See Manne, supra note 25, at 14-16; Bainbridge, supra note 83, at 1013-14.
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Brealey & Myers, supra note 41, at 59-62.
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A falling stock price does not, of course, necessarily signal poor management.
Nor does a rising stock price signal good management. Even a rising stock price
may signal poor management if the price is rising more slowly than the stock price
of similarly situated benchmark firms, and a falling stock price may signal good
management if the rate of decrease is slower than that of benchmark firms.
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See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 867 (“[A]ccurately priced securities will
enable firms to observe more accurately when corporate managers are successful.
Thus, markets for managerial services and for corporate control will function more
effectively.”).
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In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833
(1968) (discussed infra at notes 219- 222, 307 - 310 and accompanying text), a
mining company that had discovered a valuable ore deposit attempted to keep its
stock price depressed (i.e., at a level not reflecting the ore discovery) so that it could
buy up surrounding land and mineral rights without tipping off current owners of
those lands and rights. Id. at 843.
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directors or institutional investors to learn of this fact (management is
unlikely to volunteer the information), and they may thus fail to replace
managers who really ought to be replaced. In other words, identification of
mispricing within the boardroom is much less likely to occur if the price is
too high than if it is too low, and overvaluation is therefore more likely than
undervaluation to reduce the efficacy of stock price as a low-cost tool for
monitoring managers.
B. Lower Costs From Price-Decreasing Insider Trading
The previous subpart demonstrated that PDIT provides greater benefits
to investors than PEIT. This subpart examines the cost side of the balance,
concluding that the investor costs occasioned by PDIT are likely to be lower
than those caused by PEIT.
1. Less Likely to Thwart Corporate Opportunities
PDIT is less likely than PEIT to cause what is perhaps the most
important type of corporate harm occasioned by insider trading: the
thwarting of value-enhancing corporate transactions that could otherwise be
accomplished.218 To see this point, consider why PEIT might prevent such
transactions from occurring and why PDIT generally could not do so.
PEIT may injure a corporation seeking to take advantage of non-public
information regarding an asset’s hidden value. Suppose, for example, that
managers are aware that some asset the corporation seeks to acquire is
undervalued and, if purchased by the corporation, would enhance corporate
value.219 The law generally permits an asset buyer who has discovered
information regarding an asset’s hidden value to refrain from disclosing that
information,220 and the corporation will thus want to keep such information
218

See generally Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 600-02 (discussing how insider
trading could thwart value-creating corporate transactions).
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The classic case involving this sort of fact pattern is Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833, in which geologists from a mining company had discovered a valuable
ore deposit. Managers knew that the value of the company would be substantially
enhanced if it could acquire land and mineral rights from neighbors at a favorable
price.
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b), cmt. d (“A buyer of
property…is not ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make the
property more valuable than the seller supposes.”). Professor Anthony Kronman
explains why this is so:
By and large, the cases requiring disclosure involve information
which is likely to have been casually acquired…. The cases
permitting nondisclosure, on the other hand, involve information
which, on the whole, is likely to have been deliberately produced.
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a secret in order to prevent the asset’s price from rising.221 If managers who
are aware of the corporation’s forthcoming asset purchase attempt to profit
personally by purchasing their corporation’s own stock, their trading may
cause an increase in the corporation’s stock price.222 That price activity may
then cause the current owner of the asset not to sell or to demand a higher
price. PEIT, then, would squander an otherwise available corporate
opportunity.223 While such insider trading would appear to be a violation of
the insiders’ fiduciary duties, regardless of the law on insider trading,224 the
insider trading prohibition does act as a prophylactic bar to this sort of
corporate harm.
With respect to PDIT, by contrast, it is difficult to see how such trading
could thwart a value-creating corporate transaction that could otherwise be
Taken as a group, the disclosure cases give at least the appearance
of promoting allocative efficiency by limiting the assignment of
property rights to those types of information which are likely to be
the fruit of a deliberate investment (either in the development of
expertise or in actual searching).
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1978). Because the information regarding the hidden value
of an asset the corporation would like to acquire is likely to have been “deliberately
produced,” the corporation will generally have the right to refrain from disclosing
such information prior to purchase.
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In Texas Gulf Sulphur, for example, the company president specifically ordered
insiders to keep the discovery at issue a secret so as not to tip off neighboring
landowners. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
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In Texas Gulf Sulphur, for example, the stock price rose substantially following
unauthorized insider trading (from 20 7/8 when chemical assay results proved the
discovery to around 37 when the discovery was publicly announced). Id. at 847.
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PEIT could also thwart value-creating acquisitions of other businesses.
Professor Bainbridge explains:

As

If managers charged with overseeing an acquisition buy shares in
the target, and their trading has a significant upward effect on the
price of the target’s stock, the takeover will be more expensive. If
significant price and volume changes are caused by their trading,
that also might tip off others to the secret, interfering with the
bidder’s plans, as by alerting the target to the need for defensive
measures.
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 600.
224

See Todd A. Bauman, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 838,
863-64 & n. 114 (1984) (“[I]f a manager actually harms his corporation through a
particular insider-trading transaction, he should be liable to his firm for a breach of
his duty of care, even if it is determined that insider trading in general does not
violate a manager’s duty of loyalty”).
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legally accomplished. The relevant situation would be one in which the
corporation had an interest in keeping its stock’s price inflated above its true
value in order to accomplish some transaction. For example, the corporation
might desire to use its overvalued stock as consideration for a purchase, to
issue new equity at an inflated price, or to secure credit on favorable terms.
But it probably could not do so. If insiders were aware of information
indicating that the stock was overvalued but refrained from disclosing that
information, any stock price-dependent transaction entered into during the
period of inflation would likely be voidable by the corporation’s counterparty.225 Thus, corporate transactions that would be thwarted by PDIT
probably could not be legally accomplished in any event.
There is, in short, an asymmetry in the law regarding pre-contract
disclosures, and that asymmetry causes PEIT to be more value-destructive
than PDIT. Because a corporation generally need not disclose information
about hidden value before transacting on the basis of that information, it
may legitimately keep such information a secret.226 PEIT may prevent it
from doing so and may thereby thwart value-creating transactions.
Information suggesting that the corporation is overvalued, however, must
generally be disclosed.227 Accordingly, PDIT would not reveal any
corporate secrets that would not otherwise have to be revealed. It is
therefore less likely than PEIT to squander legitimate corporate
opportunities.
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See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164 (permitting rescission
of contract by party who is victim of fraudulent or material misrepresentation);
161(b) (stating circumstances under which failure to disclose negative information
may give rise to right to void contract).
226

See id. at § 161(b), cmt. d (observing that, while “[a] buyer of property … is not
ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make the property more valuable
than the seller supposes,” he is “ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent
defect of quality or title that is of such a character as would probably prevent the
buyer from buying at the contract price”); Kronman, supra note 220, at 18 (arguing
that deliberately produced information regarding hidden value need not be disclosed
prior to contracting).
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (non-disclosure of a fact
is fraudulent and renders a contract voidable where the non-disclosing party “knows
that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic
assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the
fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing”).
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2. Less Likely to Infringe Corporate Property Rights
Some scholars who are skeptical of most claims that insider trading
harms investors and society in general defend the insider trading prohibition
(some version of it, at least) on grounds that it protects corporations’
property rights to information regarding their business and prospects.228
Professor Stephen Bainbridge, for example, discounts most of the standard
arguments that insider trading is harmful229 but nonetheless concludes that
the insider trading prohibition is justifiable “as a means of protecting
property rights in information.”230 Bainbridge and other “propertarians”
explain that assigning the corporation a property right in information
regarding firm prospects, and protecting that right by banning trading by
insiders on the basis of that information, protects the firm’s economic
incentive to produce socially valuable information.231 Bainbridge admits
that property protection is not as crucial here as it is with more standard
forms of intellectual property (e.g., patents and trade secrets), for firm
managers may be motivated to produce socially valuable information
regarding the corporation’s prospects even if that information does not
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See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 598-607; Macey, supra note 24;
Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 313.
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See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 592-98 (discounting pro-regulation arguments
other than those related to protection of firm’s property rights).
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Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 791.

231

See id. at 599 (“The rationale for prohibiting insider trading is the same as that
for prohibiting patent infringement or theft of trade secrets: protecting the economic
incentive to produce socially valuable information.”); Macey, supra note 24, at 30
(“Legal rules should be developed that ensure the optimal production of
information. Analysis of how optimal production might be achieved is best seen by
viewing inside information as a form of property interest.”); Easterbrook, supra
note 18, at 313 (explaining how property protection may be necessary to preserve
incentives to create information). See also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551
(2d Cir. 1991), in which Judge Winter rationalized the federal insider trading ban as
follows:
Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in
commercial markets. It is expensive to produce, and, because it
involves facts and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried
in one’s head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those who pay to
produce information will see others reap the profit from it. Where
the profit from an activity is likely to be diverted, investment in
that activity will decline. If the law fails to protect property rights
in commercial information, therefore, less will be invested in
generating such information.
Id. at 576-77 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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receive property protection.232 Nonetheless, he argues, “[t]here is no
avoiding the necessity of assigning a property interest in the information to
either the corporation or the insider,”233 and, because assignment of the right
to the corporation is likely to have some positive incentive effect at the
margin,234 the right ought to be assigned to the corporation.235 The argument
for assigning the right to insiders, Bainbridge argues, is “considerably
weaker.”236 He says that “[t]he only plausible reason for doing so is the
argument that legalized insider trading would be an appropriate
compensation scheme.”237 In sum, the propertarians reason that because the
incentive benefits of assigning the right to the corporation would likely
exceed any benefits from providing insiders with compensation in the form
of legal insider trading, the right to inside information ought to be given to
the corporation.
This analysis assumes, though, that positive inside information (i.e.,
“good news” suggesting that the corporation is undervalued) and negative
inside information (i.e., “bad news” suggesting that the corporation is
overvalued) should be treated the same.238 In actuality, there are good
reasons to afford different treatment to the two types of information. To see
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Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 604 (conceding that “[f]rom the corporation’s
perspective, … legalizing insider trading would have a relatively small effect on the
firm’s incentive to develop new information”). See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in
the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 488-90 (2001) (arguing that firm
managers would create the socially valuable information purportedly protected by
the insider trading ban even if the corporation did not “own” the “right” to that
information).

233

Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 604.
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Id. (“As with other property rights, the law . . . should simply assume (although
the assumption will sometimes be wrong) that assigning the property right to agentproduced information to the firm maximizes the social incentives for the production
of valuable new information.”).
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Id. (“In some cases, however, insider trading will harm the corporation’s
interests and thus adversely affect its incentives in this regard [i.e., to develop new,
socially beneficial information]. This argues for assigning the property right to the
corporation, rather than the insider.”).
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Id.
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Id. See supra notes 28 - 31 and accompanying text (discussing argument that
insider trading may provide efficient compensation mechanism).
238

It also appears to assume that the right should not be transferable from the
corporation to insiders, a point that many propertarians fiercely contest. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
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this point, consider (1) why the law creates rights to information and (2)
how it ought to go about assigning those rights.
The creation of a right to information should be based upon the extent to
which creation of the right would enhance incentives to produce the
information at issue; the more likely it is that property protection would
enhance those incentives, the more appropriate it is for the law to recognize
such a right.239 This observation suggests that property status is more
appropriately afforded to positive inside information than to negative inside
information. “Good news” is, to a large degree, deliberately created by the
corporation’s agents as they perpetually work to cut costs, increase
revenues, and expand markets. “Bad news,” on the other hand, tends simply
to happen. Because there generally is less deliberate effort involved in
creating negative inside information, there is less need for property
protection at all. While it may be desirable to create incentives to discover
negative inside information (as when an enterprising manager investigates
consumer demand for his firm’s new or proposed product and discovers that
it is softer than expected, or when a mid-level accountant scrutinizes records
to discover that her peers are fudging the numbers to make the firm appear
more profitable than it really is), there is no need to provide incentives to
create the underlying facts. With respect to positive inside information, on
the other hand, the law should encourage both the discovery and the creation
of the underlying facts.240 Thus, the case for affording property status to
inside information is stronger for positive inside information than for
negative inside information, though it still might be desirable to recognize
property rights to negative inside information so as to encourage its
discovery.
The more important consideration, though, is the question of
assignment. Assuming there are good reasons for affording property status
to both positive and negative inside information, should the rights to both
sorts of information be assigned to the same party? Probably not. Investors
would be best off if the right to information regarding corporate affairs were
assigned to the corporate constituent most likely to use it to maximize firm
value: If giving the right to the information to the corporation and denying
insiders a right to use it would maximize firm value, then the corporation
ought to get the right; if instead firm value would be maximized by giving
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See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 599; Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 313-14.
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Note, though, that the case for property rights in positive inside information still
is not as strong as the case for traditional forms of intellectual property, for
managers are generally motivated to create good news even without property
protection. See Krawiec, supra note 232, at 489 (“Issuers create valuable
information about themselves to operate a successful business enterprise, not to
generate trading profits.”).
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the right to corporate agents, then investors would prefer that the right be
distributed accordingly.241 There are good reasons to believe that the
corporation is most likely to maximize the value of positive inside
information, but that corporate agents acting in their individual capacities
are more likely to maximize the value of negative inside information.
First consider positive inside information. As noted, it is often the case
that a value-enhancing corporate opportunity will be available only if the
firm is able to enter into contracts that would be thwarted (or would be
possible only on less favorable terms) by insider trades.242 If the good news
regarding the corporate opportunity were exploitable by insiders, the
opportunity and the corporate value created thereby would not be available
to the firm. Accordingly, value would be maximized by giving the firm the
right to positive inside information.
With regard to negative inside information, by contrast, employees are
more likely to be the value-maximizers. If the corporation “owns” bad
news, corporate managers will likely suppress the news to the extent they
are permitted to do so under the securities laws,243 leading to a period of
overvaluation and the costs that accompany such mispricing.244 This period
of overvaluation, unlike the period of undervaluation that will occur if
241

One can imagine a hypothetical bargain among investors and managers over how
the rights to positive and negative inside information should be allocated. The party
that could create the most value from the information would, assuming it could
capture that value for itself because the information’s benefits accrued to it naturally
or could be “sold” to those it benefited, be willing to “pay” the most for the
information. (The corporation would “pay” by providing a higher wage to
employees in exchange for their forbearance from using the information; the
employees would “pay” by demanding lower wages.) In any event, the party
valuing the information the most would likely end up with it. See generally Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960). The law, then, ought
to initially assign the right to the party most likely to create the most value from the
information – the ultimate “buyer” in the hypothetical bargain.
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Insider trades would signal the firm’s contracting partner to refrain from
executing the deal or to demand more favorable terms. See supra notes 219 - 224
and accompanying text.
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Bad news need not be disclosed absent some affirmative disclosure requirement,
such as one of the requirements imposed by the laws mandating periodic
disclosures. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Easterbrook, J.) (“We do not have a system of continuous disclosure. Instead firms
are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless positive law
creates a duty to disclose.”). This means corporate managers will often be free to sit
on bad news and allow overvaluation to persist (and increase in magnitude).
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See supra notes 148 - 209 and accompanying text (discussing agency costs
resulting from overvaluation).
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managers suppress good news in order to pursue a corporate opportunity
that might otherwise be thwarted,245 will not result in the creation of any
lasting value for the corporation. Thus, if the negative information is owned
by the corporation, it is not likely to be used in a way that enhances investor
wealth in a non-transitory fashion. If instead corporate employees own the
bad news they discover, they are likely to trade on it, pushing the
corporation’s stock price toward actual value.246 This salutary effect on
price will alleviate the investor harms associated with equity overvaluation
(e.g., agency costs) and will benefit society as a whole (not just investors)
by enhancing allocative efficiency.
In sum, the optimal allocation of property rights in inside information
regarding firm prospects – i.e., the allocation corporate agents and investors
would agree to in a hypothetical bargain247 – would likely assign the right to
positive inside information to the corporation, while allocating the right to
negative inside information to corporate insiders. Thus, PDIT, unlike PEIT,
would not infringe upon the corporation’s right to information concerning
firm prospects.
3. Less Likely to Dissuade Investors
A corporation’s liberalization of insider trading might dissuade potential
stockholders from investing in that corporation. Investors may be dissuaded
by concerns about firm value (i.e., they may perceive that a liberalized
insider trading policy will result in management decisions that lower the
firm’s fundamental value),248 or they may steer clear of the firm out of
concern that they could end up trading stock with an insider possessing an
informational advantage. It is likely, though, that investors would be less
dissuaded by an asymmetric policy that liberalized PDIT but generally
banned PEIT than by all-or-nothing policies that either permitted or banned
all insider trading.
To see this point, consider the decision calculus facing an investor
deciding among investments in three firms that are identical except for their
insider trading policies. Suppose that Firm A bans all insider trading, Firm
B permits all insider trading, and Firm C permits PDIT (at least, if it is
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See supra notes 219 - 223 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 260 - 287 and accompanying text (explaining why agents are
likely to engage in PDIT if permitted to do so).
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See supra note 241.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text and infra notes 289 - 290 and
accompanying text (discussing potential mismanagement occasioned by a
liberalized insider trading policy).
248
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disclosed)249 while generally banning PEIT. With respect to Firm A (no
insider trading allowed), the investor would take comfort in the fact that she
would not be purchasing stock from an insider with superior information,
but she would worry that the stock might be currently overvalued or that it
might become substantially overvalued, leading to increased agency costs
and a potential crash.250 With respect to Firm B (all insider trading
allowed), the investor would not be concerned about significant
overvaluation (insider trading would prevent such mispricing),251 but she
might worry that the liberalized insider trading policy could result in
insiders’ squandering corporate opportunities, thereby reducing long-term
firm value.252 With respect to Firm C (only PDIT allowed), the investor
would take comfort in the fact that the stock is unlikely to be overvalued,253
and she would not worry about insiders’ squandering otherwise available
corporate opportunities.254 While she would run the risk that she might be
buying from an insider possessing an informational advantage, she would
not be particularly concerned, for the extent of overvaluation likely would
not be great.255 Moreover, for reasons discussed below, any concerns about
corporate mismanagement would be allayed by a corporate policy requiring
PDIT to be immediately disclosed.256 Thus, of the three possible insider
trading policies, a policy authorizing PDIT, but not PEIT, seems least likely
to dissuade potential investors.
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For reasons discussed below, a firm adopting a policy liberalizing PDIT would
likely require that such trading be disclosed at the time of execution. See infra notes
260 - 280 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 132 - 215 and accompanying text (discussing overvaluation’s
effect on agency costs and reliance costs).
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As explained below, disclosed PDIT would prevent stock price overvaluation by
“derivatively informing” the market that those closest to the business believed it to
be overvalued. See infra notes 261 - 280 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 219 - 224 and accompanying text (explaining how PEIT may
squander corporate opportunities).
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See infra notes 261 - 280 and accompanying text (explaining why disclosed
PDIT will prevent overvaluation).
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See supra notes 225 - 227 and accompanying text (explaining why PDIT, unlike
PEIT, would not thwart otherwise available corporate opportunities).
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See infra notes 285 - 288 and accompanying text (explaining how liberalized
PDIT essentially creates a “bounty” for the first insider to “report” overvaluation,
thereby preventing companies from becoming significantly overvalued).
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See infra notes 289 - 296 and accompanying text (explaining how disclosure
requirement could alleviate concerns about mismanagement occasioned by
liberalized PDIT).
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C. Synthesis: An Asymmetric Insider Trading Policy as
Majoritarian Default
So far, we have seen that: (1) undervaluation is more likely to be selfcorrecting (even without insider trading) than overvaluation;257 (2) in the
long-run, undervaluation is unlikely to impose significant costs on investors,
while overvaluation is likely to do so;258 and (3) whereas insider trading that
pushes a stock’s price upward toward actual value may cause harm to the
corporation and its investors, insider trading that pushes an inflated price
downward toward value is unlikely to do so.259 Taken together, these
observations suggest that an asymmetric insider trading policy that permits
some form of PDIT, while generally banning PEIT, is the policy investors
and managers would likely bargain for were they able (practically and
legally) to do so. In other words, an asymmetric insider trading policy that
liberalizes only PDIT likely represents the “majoritarian default policy.”
But that’s the easy part. As with so many policy proposals, the devil is
in the details. Specifically, how would corporations structure a liberalized
PDIT policy so as to maximize PDIT’s salutary effect on stock price?
Would corporate insiders engage in PDIT if they were legally permitted to
do so? And would a policy liberalizing PDIT encourage mismanagement
and/or hinder the flow of negative information within the corporation? The
following discussion outlines the sort of liberalized PDIT policy
corporations would likely adopt (Part II.C.1) and addresses potential
problems such a policy might create (Part II.C.2).
1. The Design of the Default Policy: Disclosed PDIT
Permitted
The fundamental objective of a liberalized PDIT policy would be to
harness insider trading’s power to drive stock prices toward their
fundamental value.260 Accordingly, structuring an effective PDIT policy
requires consideration of the mechanisms by which insider trading leads to
more accurate securities prices. Insider trading has its price-correcting
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See supra Part II.A.1. (explaining why managers and analysts are more likely to
correct undervaluation than overvaluation).
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See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining why overvaluation is more likely to cause
significant investor harm than undervaluation).
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See supra Part II.B (discussing how PEIT is more likely than PDIT to squander
corporate opportunities, infringe upon corporate property rights to information, and
dissuade potential investors).
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As discussed above, there is near consensus among economists that insider
trading pushes a stock’s market price toward its fundamental value. See supra note
25 and accompanying text.
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effect because it conveys a valuable piece of information: that those closest
to the company and most informed about its operations believe it to be either
undervalued (in the case of insider purchases) or overvalued (in the case of
insider sales).261 Armed with that information, investors who are not privy
to the actual facts motivating the insider transactions will nonetheless follow
the lead of the insiders by buying or selling the stock or adjusting their
reservation prices (i.e., the amount they would be willing to pay to obtain
the stock or would require to give it up).262 As a result of this process, the
market price of the stock will change to reflect the information conveyed by
insider trades and, because insiders are the individuals best-informed about
the company’s true prospects, will become more accurate.263
As Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman famously
explained, there are actually two mechanisms by which insider trading may
“derivatively inform” traders of stock mispricing (and thereby promote
price-correction).264 First, investors may engage in “trade decoding”
whereby they deduce binary information regarding a firm’s prospects (i.e.,
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See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 629-30 (explaining why insider
trading will tend to push stock prices in the right direction).
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See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 324 (1998) (explaining
how investors follow the lead of insiders in determining how to value a stock and
where to invest their money).
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It is important to recognize that insider trading’s salutary price effect results from
the information such trading conveys, not from the fact that the trading alters the
supply of or demand for the security at issue. The supply effect of insider trading
could not be responsible for the price changes it causes because the relevant supply
at issue is not the particular security being traded but is instead the risk-reward
combination offered by that security and a host of others and is thus so vast that any
increased or reduced demand by insiders would be too small to affect price. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 630 (noting that because “the relevant supply
for purposes of determining the impact of insider trading is not the ‘float’ of the
particular security, but rather the total of all other investment opportunities with a
similar relationship between risk and return,” the supply change occasioned by
insider trading “is simply too small to have any but a transitory, and probably
insignificant, impact on the price of the security”); R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 35-44 (2d ed. 1983) (making similar
point); Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 335-36 (making
similar point).
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The trading and reservation price-adjustment that occurs following insider trades
is “derivatively informed,” for it is based on information inferred from facts related
to the trading of others. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 572-79
(describing derivatively informed trading).
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that they are either improving or worsening) from insiders’ trades.265 The
problem with trade decoding, Professors Gilson and Kraakman argued, is
that “uninformed traders must be able to identify informed traders
individually and observe their trading activities directly,”266 and they are
somewhat limited in their ability to do so because not all trades by insiders
must be disclosed to the market, and those that must be disclosed need not
be disclosed immediately.267 Non-insiders may also engage in “price
decoding,” whereby they observe a price change occasioned by insider
trading of a sufficient volume, compare the price change to the public
information concerning the firm’s prospects, and infer what possible new
information would successfully explain observed price changes.268
Trade decoding and price decoding differ in terms of their preconditions
(i.e., what is required in order for each to occur?) and their effects (i.e., what
information does each convey?). With respect to preconditions, trade
decoding requires some identification of insider trades,269 while price
decoding does not require such identification270 but instead requires trading
of a quantity sufficient to cause some sort of change in price or observable
trading volume.271 With respect to the level of information provided, trade
decoding reveals only whether a firm’s prospects are improving or
declining, whereas price-decoding provides information regarding why the
firm’s prospects are changing.272
In light of these differences, trade decoding is more likely to be the
means by which insider trading would reduce the price of overvalued
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Id. at 573 (“Trade decoding occurs whenever uninformed traders glean trading
information by directly observing the transactions of informed traders.”).
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Id. at 574.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2005) (requiring only that officers, directors, and ten
percent shareholders – no other insiders – disclose their trades in their own
company’s securities within two business days).
268

Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 575 (describing price decoding).
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Id. at 574 (noting that “uninformed traders must be able to identify informed
traders individually and observe their trading activities directly”).
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Id. 574-75 (noting that price decoding “does not require uninformed traders to
discover the identity of their informed cohorts”).
271

Id. at 575 (summarizing “the logic of price decoding” as follows: “When trading
on insider information is of sufficient volume to cause a change in price, this
otherwise inexplicable change may itself signal the presence of new information to
the uninformed.”).
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Id. at 575-76 (explaining that price decoding may permit investors to determine
the actual content of the information generating insider trades).
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equity.273 Correction of overvaluation requires only that investors know that
insiders believe, and are willing to bet money on the fact, that their firm is
overvalued. Because investors need not know the reason for the insiders’
belief, the enhanced information provided by price decoding is of little value
if the goal is simply to align price with fundamental value.274 Moreover, the
precondition for trade decoding is more likely to be met than the
precondition for price decoding. It is unlikely that insiders believing a firm
to be overvalued will sell enough stock to move the market price by altering
supply.275 It is more likely that insider sales (or purchases of put options)
will be revealed to the market. First, insiders’ brokers may tend to share
information regarding insider transactions with others.276 Second, many
insiders (officers, directors, and shareholders owning at least ten percent of
voting securities) will have to disclose their sales within two business days
pursuant to Exchange Act Section 16(a),277 a provision that has been rather
markedly amended since Professors Gilson and Kraakman opined that trade
decoding would be unlikely to occur in a timely fashion.278
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Id. at 631 (arguing that trade decoding is the primary means by which insider
trading leads to market efficiency).
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This is simply an application of F.A. Hayek’s famous point that for efficiency
purposes it is not necessary for decision makers to know why willingness to pay for
a commodity has changed, but merely that it has. See Hayek, supra note 34, at 525
(“It is always a question of the relative importance of the particular things with
which he is concerned, and the causes which alter their relative importance are of no
interest to him beyond the effect on those concrete things of his own
environment.”).
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See supra note 263 (noting the unlikelihood that non-transitory stock price
changes could be occasioned by supply effects resulting from insider transactions).
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This is an instance of what Professors Gilson and Kraakman term “pure”
informational leakage, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 572-73.
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15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2) (2005).
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30,
2002), amended Section 16(a) to require that insider transactions be reported within
two business days, that they be reported electronically (so the SEC could quickly
make them public), and that they be posted on the relevant corporation’s Internet
website at the time of reporting. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2) (2005) (reflecting
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments). Prior to this amendment, Section 16(a) permitted
paper filing, did not require disclosure at the corporation level, and required
reporting to the SEC only by the tenth day of the month following the transaction at
issue (so up to forty days could pass before insider trades were publicly reported).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2001) (pre-Sarbanes-Oxley). Thus, Professors Gilson and
Kraakman argued (in 1984) that “while certain insiders are required by Section
16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose their trading, disclosure is required
only some ten to forty days after the trade, hardly an aid to efficient operation of the
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Of course, the easier it is for market participants to identify instances of
insider selling (and thus to engage in trade decoding), the more likely price
correction is to occur, and to do so rapidly.279 Thus, a corporation seeking to
prevent the overvaluation of its stock by liberalizing PDIT would probably
adopt procedures that would ensure that such trades could quickly be
identified by traders. It might, for example, require its agents to report their
sales (or purchases of put options) immediately, or it might require agents to
funnel all such transactions through particular brokers, who would
immediately report the transactions as a matter of course. The firm would
also ensure that the reported information was publicized as quickly as
possible, perhaps by maintaining a constantly updated Internet site
cataloguing insider stock sales and put option purchases. Analysts
following the company, then, could monitor the site for interesting trades
(i.e., large sales or put purchases by employees in a position to know some
sort of price-decreasing information) and could direct their clients to trade in
accordance with the information they gleaned.280 In short, most firms would
elect a policy that permitted immediately disclosed PDIT.
2. Potential Problems
The primary objective of a corporate policy liberalizing PDIT could be
achieved only if corporate insiders would actually engage in authorized
PDIT. Moreover, the liberalized PDIT policy would be counterproductive if
the value enhancement occasioned by preventing and reducing
overvaluation were outweighed by value destruction resulting from an
increase in corporate mismanagement. Critics may therefore contend (1)
that corporate insiders would not engage in PDIT even if permitted to do so,
or (2) that the value loss resulting from authorizing PDIT would outweigh
any value enhancement occasioned by reducing the incidence and
magnitude of equity overvaluation. Neither criticism undermines the case
for a liberalized PDIT policy.

derivatively informed trading mechanism.” Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at
632.
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Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 868 (“The greater the ability of market
participants to identify insider trading, the more information such trading will
convey.”); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 631-32 (“[T]he greater the
number of uninformed traders who are able to learn the identity of insider traders,
the size of their trades, and other derivative information, the more effectively the
derivatively informed trading mechanism will operate and the greater will be the
market’s relative efficiency with respect to the inside information.”).
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A number of private services compile information on insider trading reports and
distribute it to market participants. See Fried, supra note 262, at 324.
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a. Would Insiders Actually Engage in Disclosed
PDIT?
There are several reasons to doubt that PDIT, even if authorized, would
be widespread. In many (perhaps most) corporate cultures, betting against
the company would be considered treasonous, and insiders considering
whether to engage in PDIT might be concerned about negative job
repercussions.281 Perhaps more importantly, insiders may forego PDIT
because they personally stand to benefit from overvalued equity. Many
insiders attain reputational benefits from being associated with a firm with a
high stock price,282 and, of course, the value of their holdings of company
stock is enhanced, at least temporarily, if the stock is overvalued. Thus,
even if they know the mispricing will eventually be corrected, one might
expect them to hold on to appreciating stock for as long as possible so as to
maximize their trading gains. In addition, insiders may worry that a price
correction will result in a corporate shake-up that threatens their jobs or
compensation.283 One therefore might initially wonder whether insiders
who knew of overvaluation would reveal it by engaging in authorized PDIT.
They likely would, for the temptation of financial rewards would
probably overwhelm the forces stifling PDIT. A company that had adopted
a liberalized PDIT policy would have made an apparent attempt to alter the
corporate norms against betting against the company, so insiders
considering whether to engage in PDIT would have received an implicit
green light from their principals. Undoubtedly, some corporations would
adopt an “official” liberalized PDIT policy, while simultaneously
maintaining a corporate norm that such trading is improper, but such a
clandestine norm would be difficult to maintain. In the end, the constant
allure of potential insider trading profits (which grow as the extent of
overvaluation increases) coupled with the corporation’s official imprimatur
on PDIT would likely lead to defections by rogue insiders, who would have
strong grounds for attacking any apparently retaliatory employment
decision. Corporate norms against PDIT, then, likely pose little barrier to
the success of a liberalized PDIT policy.
Nor is it likely that insiders would collusively refrain from engaging in
PDIT in order to maintain and enhance a high stock price. As antitrust
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Cf. Surowiecki, supra note 54, at 224-27 (discussing powerful social norms
against short-selling).
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See supra notes 141 - 143 and accompanying text.
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This is a version of the “last period” problem discussed supra at notes 62 - 63
and accompanying text.
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scholars have long noted, cartels are inherently unstable.284 Because the first
colluder to defect gains a disproportionate share of any surplus created by
the collusion, each participant has a private incentive to be the first
defector.285 With price-fixing, the first cartel member to lower his price
from the agreed-upon level stands to steal business from all other
participants, so cheating (or the possibility thereof) usually undermines a
cartel.286 Here, the first insider to engage in disclosed PDIT would make the
most money on her sale, for after the initial instance of publicly disclosed
PDIT, the price at which subsequent sales could be consummated would
likely be reduced. Each insider colluding to keep the stock price inflated
would therefore face a private incentive to be the first defector.287 And, of
course, the magnitude of this incentive would grow as the discrepancy
between price and value expanded. Any conspiracy to refrain from PDIT is
therefore likely to fail.
Ultimately, liberalized PDIT provides a means of rewarding
whistleblowers with a “bounty” for conveying information (via their
trading) that the stock price is overvalued. In many – perhaps most – cases,
the price inflation will be due to some concealment by insiders. Thus, in
authorizing publicly disclosed PDIT, a corporation would be putting in place
a bounty system designed to promote candor by rewarding insiders who
blew the whistle on non-disclosure of material information. The financial
rewards available from this sort of bounty scheme (which is a wellestablished means of combating fraud288 and would be valued by investors)

284

See 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 420-21 (Richard Schmalensee
& Richard D. Willig eds., 1989) (explaining how incentives to cheat render cartels
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See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515,
518 (2004) (observing that “cartels are inherently unstable” because members have
an incentive to cheat by defecting or reporting the cartel).
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PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2A ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 405b2, at __
(noting that “price fixing often carries the seeds of its own destruction[,] [f]or the
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additional sales”).
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Cf. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 874 (“Collusion to decrease the value of
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For example, the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730
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67

would likely drive knowledgeable insiders to engage in PDIT, despite any
official corporate norms or collusive tendencies that might discourage such
trading.
b. What About Corporate Mismanagement and/or
Impairment of Intra-Firm Information Flow?
Even if one were confident that insiders would engage in authorized
PDIT, thereby reducing the incidence and magnitude of overvalued equity,
one might still oppose a liberalized PDIT policy if it threatened to cause
value-reducing actions by insiders. At least two types of conduct are
potentially troubling. First, authorizing PDIT may create a perverse
incentive for insiders to create conditions that reduce stock price and then to
trade before the stock price falls.289 Second, liberalizing PDIT may impair
the intra-firm flow of important information, for insiders at each level within
the corporate hierarchy may delay the transmission of negative information
until they have traded on the bad news.290 If the investor losses occasioned
by deliberate mismanagement or delayed disclosure outweigh the value of
gains resulting from reducing equity overvaluation, a policy liberalizing
PDIT will not be optimal.
In actuality, there is probably little reason to worry about deliberate
mismanagement or delayed disclosure. As Professors Carlton and Fischel
have observed, mismanagement occasioned by the possibility of gains from
PDIT is unlikely because corporate managers, who generally work in teams,
cannot engage in value-destroying mismanagement without persuading their
colleagues to go along with the strategy, and any particular employee’s
ability to engage in mismanagement will therefore be constrained by his
colleagues’ attempts to maximize firm value or to gain personally by

LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT (Howard W. Cox & Peter B. Hutt II
eds., 2d ed. 1999).
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As noted, see supra notes 14, 21-22 and accompanying text, one of the chief
arguments against deregulating insider trading in general is that such deregulation
would create perverse incentives for managers to create “bad news” upon which
they could earn trading profits. See generally Levmore, supra note 14, at 149
(noting that if insider trading is permitted “an insider can profit from a decrease in
the firm’s stock price as well as in increase; the temptation of profit might actually
encourage an insider to act against the corporation’s interest”); Mendelson, supra
note 14, at 489-90; Schotland, supra note 3, at 1451.
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See Haft, supra note 13, at 1054-55 (arguing that, if insider trading were
permitted, “subordinates would stall the upward flow of critical information to
maximize their opportunities for financial gain,” resulting in an “impair[ment] [of]
corporate decision-making at all hierarchical levels”).
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exposing proposed mismanagement.291 Moreover, if PDIT must be
immediately disclosed, as would be likely,292 any traders responsible for
causing a stock price to fall wouldbe exposed. Both senior managers and
plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to pay keen attention to PDIT disclosures. If an
insider’s trade were followed by a stock price decrease, and the insider’s
position within the firm suggested that he had some control over the
business decision(s) that reduced the firm’s value, he would likely be
subject to adverse employment action or, if he were senior enough, to a
derivative suit.293 Similarly, if an insider were to delay disclosure of
negative information in order to trade on it first, his superiors could easily
note the timing of his trade and, if the delay harmed (or could have harmed)
the enterprise,294 would likely punish the offender. In short, publicity will
police instances of deliberate mismanagement and delay in conveying
information.
Of course, the ultimate rejoinder to claims that the liberalized PDIT
policy proposed herein will reduce corporate value is that the proposed
policy is merely a default rule. If a corporation finds that the costs
associated with a liberalized PDIT policy exceed the benefits to investors, it
will likely jettison the policy, for competitive capital markets encourage
firms to minimize their costs of capital by adopting insider trading policies
that maximize firm value.295 This Article argues that most firms would
likely adopt a policy permitting PDIT while generally banning PEIT. If that
rule is adopted as the default policy, firms discovering that liberalized PDIT
creates greater losses than benefits can – and will – adopt more restrictive
291

See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 874 (noting that “the ability of any one
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contributed to value-reducing corporate decisions.
294

Given the speed with which securities trades can be executed, delaying
conveyance of information in order to first trade on it likely would have little
adverse effect on the intra-firm flow of information.
295

See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-63 (“If it is bad, firms that allow
insider trading will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with firms that
curtail insider trading.”).
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policies.296 In particular, they may limit by contract the class of insiders
permitted to engage in PDIT. They may decide, for example, that senior
managers, who are best able to create bad news, should not be permitted to
engage in such trading. Capital market pressure will lead them to adopt the
PDIT restrictions most favored by investors.
III.

The Legal Feasibility of an Asymmetric Insider Trading
Regime

Part II argued that an asymmetric insider trading regime, in which PDIT
is treated more leniently than PEIT, is the majoritarian default—i.e., the
bargain managers and investors would likely strike were they able to
negotiate freely. This Part argues that such an asymmetric regime is feasible
under current insider trading doctrine, even if unclear issues raised by
current doctrine are resolved in a manner that is fairly hostile toward efforts
to contract out of insider trading liability.
In order to articulate this legal argument, I must begin with a brief
summary of insider trading doctrine. Many readers will no doubt be
familiar with the relevant legal rules and may therefore wish to skip Subpart
A, which describes current insider trading doctrine, and proceed directly to
Subpart B, which explains why an asymmetric insider trading regime would
be permissible under current law.297
296

Of course, a corollary to this position is that the ban on price-enhancing insider
trading should also be waiveable. If a corporation were to discover that the costs
associated with PEIT (e.g., the potential for squandered corporate opportunities, see
supra notes 219 - 224 and accompanying text) were outweighed by benefits (e.g.,
lower salary requirements for managers, see supra notes 28 - 31 and accompanying
text), the corporation should be permitted to opt out of the ban on PEIT. Professors
Carlton and Fischel have argued for this type of private contractual approach to
insider trading. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 861-66. While I am entirely
sympathetic to their position, my point here is merely that an asymmetric insider
trading policy permitting PDIT but not PEIT is likely the policy most corporate
constituents would bargain for if legally and practically able to do so and therefore
ought to be adopted as the default policy. Moreover, for reasons explained below,
the asymmetric insider trading policy proposed herein could be adopted under
current law. See infra notes 344 - 368 and accompanying text. By contrast, the
purely contractual approach advocated by Professors Carlton and Fischel probably
is not achievable under current law. See id.
297

While current law would permit authorized PDIT, the SEC, which has a long
history of seeking to expand the insider trading prohibition, see Bainbridge, supra
note 4, at 583-86 (discussing regulators’ zeal to expand insider trading prohibition
beyond limits of enabling statute). would probably pursue legal action against
corporations that attempted to authorize PDIT and/or against the insiders who
traded pursuant to such authorization. Accordingly, corporations are unlikely to
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A. Current Legal Doctrine
Insider trading, generally defined as trading in securities while in
possession of material, non-public information,298 may run afoul of several
provisions of federal law. In addition to Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act,299 which posits a prophylactic ban on “short-swing profits”
earned by certain insiders trading in their own companies’ stock,300 there are
three basic theories under which trading on inside information may violate
federal law.301 Two of these theories, the “disclose or abstain” rule (also
called the “classical theory”) and the misappropriation doctrine, derive from
Securities Exchange Rule 10b-5,302 which is a general anti-fraud rule that
was promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.303 The third theory derives from Securities Exchange Rule 14e-3,304 a
more narrowly tailored rule that was promulgated under Exchange Act
Section 14(e). 305
1. The Disclose or Abstain Rule
When it applies, the disclose or abstain rule requires a trader possessing
material non-public information either to disclose her inside information
before trading or to abstain from trading altogether.306 The rule had its
authorize PDIT, despite the likely legality of such trading, absent express approval
of such trading by regulators.
298

Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 772.

299

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2005).

300

Section 16(b) requires a defined set of corporate insiders (directors, officers, and
shareholders possessing at least ten percent of voting securities) to disgorge profits
on any set of purchase and sale transactions occurring within a six month period. 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2005). This disgorgement requirement applies regardless of
whether the statutory insider traded on the basis of, or even possessed, material nonpublic information. It therefore is not an insider trading ban per se.
301

Insider trading may also violate federal mail and wire fraud laws, see 18 U.S.C. §
1341 (2005) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005) (wire fraud), but the theory of
fraud under those provisions mirrors the two theories under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b5 and will not be discussed here. See L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 741-43 (1995).
302

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).

303

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005).

304

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).

305

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).

306

See generally Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 531-37 (discussing disclose or abstain
rule). In a face-to-face transaction, the information must be disclosed, prior to
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genesis in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,307 discussed above,308 in which the
Second Circuit held that insiders of a corporation that owned land upon
which a valuable mineral deposit was discovered had violated Rule 10b-5 by
purchasing stock of their company prior to public disclosure of the ore
strike.309 This duty to disclose or abstain, the court reasoned, was inherent
in Rule 10b-5’s underlying policy of protecting “the justifiable expectation
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.”310
In Chiarella v. United States,311 the Supreme Court expressed approval
of a disclose or abstain rule but found it to be based not on some implicit
policy of equal access to information but instead on the fiduciary
relationship existing between a corporate insider and her trading partner.312
The Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on fraud is violated when
a corporate insider, who owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s
shareholders, purchases stock from a shareholder without first informing her
of material, non-public information of which the insider is aware.313 The
fraud, of course, is not an affirmative misrepresentation (assuming the
insider did not actually lie about the information to which he was privy), but

trading, directly to the insider’s trading partner. If the transaction is accomplished
on an impersonal stock exchange, as most securities transactions are, the
information must first be publicly disclosed via some broad medium (e.g., a
newswire).
307

401 F.2d 833.

308

See supra notes 217 - 222 and accompanying text.

309

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.

310

Id. at 848 (holding that, in light of Rule 10b-5’s underlying policy of equal
access to information, “anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed.”).
311

445 U.S. 222 (1980).

312

Id. at 235 (“We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the
mere possession of nonpublic market information.”); id. at 233 (declining to
recognize “a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, non-public information” because “[f]ormulation of such a
broad duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises
from a specific relationship between to parties, … should not be undertaken absent
some explicit evidence of congressional intent”).

313

Id. at 227-30 (explaining how fraud may result from non-disclosure by corporate
insider who is a fiduciary of his trading partner).
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is instead failure to speak in the face of a duty to do so.314 The duty to
speak, the Court reasoned, arises from the fiduciary relationship between
insider and trader.315 Accordingly, the Chiarella defendant, an employee of
a printing firm hired to assist the buyer in a corporate acquisition, could not
have violated Rule 10b-5 by purchasing stock of the target corporation, for
he was not a fiduciary of the target corporation’s shareholders and thus had
no duty to disclose the non-public information in his possession.316 The
Court’s reasoning implied, though, that corporate insiders possessing
material, non-public information would violate Rule 10b-5 if they traded in
their company’s stock without first disclosing their inside information.
The Chiarella Court’s conclusion that a fiduciary relationship created
the insider’s duty to disclose or abstain reined in Texas Gulf Sulphur, which
would have imposed such a duty whenever anyone with material, non-public
information traded with anyone else. A subsequent Court decision showed,
however, that the disclose or abstain duty still applies fairly broadly. In
Dirks v. SEC,317 the Court posited two rules that expanded the reach of the
disclose or abstain rule. First, the Court noted that nominal outsiders whose
relationship with the corporation is sufficiently close (e.g., lawyers,
underwriters, consultants) may be deemed “constructive insiders” and may
therefore be subject to the disclose or abstain rule.318 In addition, the Court
reasoned that under certain circumstances the rule will apply to outsider
“tippees” who receive material, non-public information from actual or
constructive insiders.319
Despite its expansion in Dirks, the disclose or abstain rule left a
substantial loophole in the insider trading liability scheme. If the duty to
314

Id. at 228 (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so.”).
315

Id. at 227 (“That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel
twist of the law.”).
316

Id. at 231-35 (explaining basis of reversal of defendant’s conviction).

317

463 U.S. 646 (1983).

318

Id. at 655, n. 14 (“Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of
the shareholders.”).
319

The Court explained that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when [1] the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee and [2] the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach.” Id. at 660.
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disclose or abstain, and thus potential insider trading liability, arises from
the fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and her trading
partner, individuals who are neither insiders (actual or constructive) nor
tippees (“inheritors” of an insider’s fiduciary duty) may freely trade on the
basis of material, non-public information. For example, an attorney
representing the bidder in a forthcoming tender offer could freely purchase
stock of the target corporation prior to the announcement of the tender offer,
for the attorney would not owe her trading partner a duty to disclose and
thus could not be liable for fraud. To respond to this loophole, the SEC
adopted Rule 14e-3 and pressed the Supreme Court to approve the
“misappropriation doctrine.”
2. Rule 14e-3
320

Rule 14e-3, adopted pursuant to the SEC’s statutory authority to
“prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraud in connection with
a tender offer,321 prohibits anyone with knowledge of a forthcoming tender
offer from trading on that information prior to public disclosure of the offer.
Specifically, the rule states that if an offeror has taken “a substantial step”
toward making a tender offer, anyone who has learned of the forthcoming
offer from the offeror, the offeree, or an agent of either must refrain from
trading in the securities of either (unless one of the narrow, enumerated
exceptions applies) until there has been public disclosure of the offer “by
press release or otherwise”322 Moreover, insiders of a bidder or target may
not divulge confidential information about a tender offer to persons who are
likely to violate the rule by trading on the basis of that information.323 The
rule thus closes the loophole left by Chiarella and Dirks, but only with
respect to inside information related to tender offers. The rule does not ban
trading by outsiders on the basis of non-public information that is not related
to a forthcoming tender offer.
3. The Misappropriation Doctrine
The misappropriation doctrine aims to close the loophole left by Rule
14e-3. Under the misappropriation theory, a person who receives material,
non-public information via a fiduciary or confidential relationship defrauds
the source of her information if she trades upon it without first informing
that source of her intention to do so. 324 The SEC had articulated the
320

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2005).

321

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2005).

322

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2005).

323

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(e) (2005).

324

See infra notes 339 - 341 and accompanying text.
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misappropriation theory in Chiarella, arguing before the Supreme Court that
the defendant’s secret trading amounted to fraud against the source of his
non-public information and thus gave rise to a violation of Rule 10b-5.325
While four justices accepted the theory,326 the Chiarella majority declined to
base liability upon it because it had not been presented to the jury.327 The
Second Circuit, however, approved the misappropriation theory as a basis
for Rule 10b-5 liability in United States v. Newman328 and relied upon the
theory in several other insider trading cases.329
The Supreme Court eventually approved the theory in United States v.
O’Hagan.330 Defendant O’Hagan’s law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, had been
retained to assist Grand Metropolitan PLC with a possible tender offer for
Pillsbury Company.331 Because of his position at the firm, O’Hagan learned
of Grand Metropolitan’s plans and, unbeknownst to his partners or Grand
Metropolitan, purchased Pillsbury call options and shares.332 When the
tender offer was announced, Pillsbury stock soared, enabling O’Hagan to
reap a $4.3 million profit.333 The government quickly charged O’Hagan
with insider trading.334 It could not, however, establish a claim under the
classical disclose or abstain rule approved in Chiarella, for O’Hagan was
not a fiduciary of his trading partners (Pillsbury shareholders and call
writers) and thus could not have defrauded them by failing to speak in the
face of a duty to do so.335 The government therefore charged O’Hagan with
violations of federal mail fraud statutes and Rule 14e-3.336 It also asserted
that he violated Rule 10b-5 by deceiving the sources of his inside
325

See Brief for the United States in Chiarella v. United States (available at 1979
WL 199454) at *28-*38.

326

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

327

Id. at 235-36.

328

664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).

329

See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’d on
other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).

330

521 U.S. 642 (1997).

331

Id. at 647.

332

Id.

333

Id. at 648.

334

Id.

335

Id. at 653 n. 5 (“The Government could not have prosecuted O’Hagan under the
classical theory, for O’Hagan was not an ‘insider’ of Pillsbury, the corporation in
whose stock he traded.”).

336

Id. at 648-49.
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information – his law firm (Dorsey & Whitney) and its client (Grand
Metropolitan), both of whom he owed fiduciary duties.337 A jury convicted
O’Hagan on all counts.338
In affirming O’Hagan’s conviction, the Supreme Court expressly
approved the government’s assertion that “a person commits fraud ‘in
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information.”339 Such a trader “deal[s] in deception,” the Court stated,
because he feigns loyalty to his source while actually using confidential
information for his own self-serving purposes.340 Because this feigned
loyalty occurs “in connection with” a sale or purchase of a security, the
Court reasoned, it violates Rule 10b-5.341 The Court thus recognized the
misappropriation theory as a “complement” to the classical disclose or
abstain theory: In the latter, securities fraud occurs because the trader fails
to disclose information to his trading partner, of whom he is a fiduciary; in
the former, securities fraud occurs because the trader “feigns fidelity to the
source” of his information, a source to whom he owes fiduciary duties.342
The Court was careful to note, though, that there can be no liability under
the misappropriation theory when the trader first informs his source of his
intention to trade on the source’s information.343
337

Id. at 648, 653.

338

Id. at 649.

339

Id. at 652.

340

Id. at 653.

341

Id. at 656 (“This [‘in connection with’] element is satisfied because the
fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential
information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information
to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus
coincide.”).
342

The Court explained:
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to
capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale
of securities. The classical theory targets a corporation insider’s
breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts;
the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of
nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a
duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the
information.

Id. at 652-53.
343

Id. at 655 (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary informs the
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B. The Permissibility of (Authorized) PDIT Under Current Legal
Doctrine
The liability scheme described in Subpart A leaves open two questions
that affect the legality of authorized PDIT.344 First, does Rule 10b-5
prohibit only “deceptive” insider trading, or does the rule reach all instances
of classical insider trading that involve a breach of fiduciary duty?345
Second, if the latter, are the relevant fiduciary duties purely contractual in
nature?346 This subpart examines the legality of authorized PDIT given the
possible answers to these two open questions of law. It concludes that
authorized PDIT is legally permissible under all three possible legal
scenarios: where the law forbids only deceptive insider trading (Part II.B.1);
where even candid (i.e., non-deceptive) classical insider trading is forbidden
but fiduciary duties are contractual in nature (Part II.B.2); and where the law
forbids candid classical insider trading and fiduciary duties are not purely
matters of contract (Part II.B.3).
1. If Only Deceptive Insider Trading Is
Forbidden
Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued persuasively that “candid”
insider trading – i.e., insider trading in which the insider has stated up front
that she may trade on the basis of material, non-public information – cannot
violate Rule 10b-5.347 Professor Prakash reasons that Rule 10b-5 and its
enabling statute prohibit only intentional misrepresentations, not mere
breaches of fiduciary duty.348 Thus, insider trading that involves a breach of
source that he plans to trade on the non-public information, there is no ‘deceptive
device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation….”).
344

“Authorized” PDIT refers to PDIT conducted by an insider at a company that has
explicitly permitted such trading.

345

See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 548-49 (observing that O’Hagan left open
whether “brazen misappropriators” could violate Rule10b-5 and whether
“authorized trading” could give rise to liability under the classical theory).
346

See Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty in Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 539 (1997) (discussing “the long-standing debate
between those who have argued that fiduciary duties are and should be essentially
contractual in nature and those who argue for some restrictions on waiving those
duties”).
347

See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1491 (1999).
348

Id. at 1510 (“O’Hagan correctly reaffirms that a breach of fiduciary duty is
simply not enough for misappropriation or Rule 10b-5 liability; a deception is
necessary.”) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court first established that
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fiduciary duty to a trading partner or information source, but does not
involve feigned fidelity to that person, simply cannot violate Rule 10b-5
(unless, of course, the trading involves some other form of fraud).349 Such
trading may be punishable under state laws governing fiduciary duties, but it
is not fraudulent.
The primary basis for Professor Prakash’s claim that Rule 10b-5 does
not reach candid trading is the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s O’Hagan
decision.350 In that decision, the Court (1) reiterated that the deception
involved in insider trading is what causes such trading to run afoul of Rule
10b-5;351 (2) clarified that the deception at issue in a misappropriation case
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not prohibit mere breaches of fiduciary duty in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which the Court held that
controlling shareholders who breached a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by
offering allegedly inadequate consideration in a short-form merger would not,
absent deception, transgress Rule 10b-5. Id. at 473-76. The Court explained:
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.
… Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint
states a cause of action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if the
conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as “manipulative or
deceptive” within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 473-74.
349

Prakash, supra note 347, at 1510-12.

350

Id. at 1510 (“Properly understood, [O’Hagan] indicates that classical insiders
may avoid Rule 10b-5 liability even when they trade on material, non-public
information on an anonymous exchange, so long as they do not deceive their
shareholders.”). Professor Prakash also cites pre-O’Hagan appeals court cases in
support of his decision. See id. at 1507-09 (citing Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073
(10th Cir. 1993) and McCormick v. Fund American Companies Inc., 26 F.3d 869
(9th Cir. 1994)). In Jensen, the Tenth Circuit held that a purported insider’s failure
to disclose certain material, non-public information prior to trading did not violate
Rule 10b-5 because the trader openly revealed his “failure to disclose” further
information.” Jensen, 1 F.3d at 1078. The court explained that when “the nondisclosing party explicitly informs the other party of his failure to disclose [material,
non-public information], an omission will not be misleading” in the absence of
special circumstances. Id. In McCormick, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
company’s candid refusal to disclose all material, non-public information prior to
purchasing its shares did not mislead a “sophisticated” seller. McCormick, 26 F.3d
at 884. Professor Prakash argues that the reasoning of Jensen and McCormick adds
further support to the view that candid insider trading, even if it violates a fiduciary
duty, cannot violate Rule 10b-5. Prakash, supra note 347, at 1509.
351

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (recognizing that “§10(b) is not an all-purpose breach
of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving manipulation or
deception”).
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is the trader’s “feigning fidelity” to the source of her information;352 and (3)
conceded that a misappropriator who informed her source of her intention to
trade before actually doing so could not violate Rule 10b-5 (though she
might be liable for breach of fiduciary duty).353 Professor Prakash
concludes that such reasoning must similarly apply in classical (i.e., disclose
or abstain) insider trading cases: Since deception must be present for there
to be a violation of Rule 10b-5, and since the deception at issue in a classical
insider trading case is feigned fidelity to the trading partner, an insider may
avoid liability under Rule 10b-5 by stating prior to trading that she intends
to trade on the basis of material, non-public information.354 Such an
admission, which would preclude the feigned fidelity that gives rise to Rule
10b-5 liability, could be made by the insider to her trading partner in a faceto-face transaction or by the insider to the market in general (via public
disclosure) in an exchange transaction.355 Moreover, if the corporation
announced generally that its agents may trade on the basis of material, nonpublic information, then the agents, in doing so, would not be feigning
fidelity to their trading partners, who would be on notice that corporate
agents might buy from or sell to them on the basis of inside information.356
Under Professor Prakash’s interpretation of post-O’Hagan insider trading
doctrine, then, a corporation would be free to adopt a policy authorizing
PDIT, and an insider who traded pursuant to such policy would not violate
Rule 10b-5.
While Professor Prakash’s understanding of insider trading doctrine is
intuitively appealing (and would appear to be the only interpretation that can

352

Id. (“[T]he deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning
fidelity to the source of information….”).
353

Id. (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary informs the source that
he plans to trade on the non-public information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and
thus no § 10(b) violation – although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable
under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.”).
354

Prakash, supra note 347, at 1515 (“After disclosing an intent to trade on material,
non-public information to the shareholders, any insider breach can no longer be
considered concealed or deceptive. It is out in the open.”).
355

Id. at 1515-16 (discussing various ways disclosure of intent to trade might
occur).
356

Id. at 1516 (“[I]f company Y authorizes X's insider trades, later trades certainly
cannot be considered fraudulent.”). Moreover, if the corporation had previously
announced that its insiders may trade on the basis of material, non-public
information, then an outsider trader’s reliance on any belief regarding insiders’
“fidelity” would not be justifiable and thus could not support a fraud claim.
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make sense of O’Hagan’s dictum regarding authorized trading357), it has not
garnered a wide following. No post-O’Hagan decision has approved
Professor Prakash’s reasoning, and most commentators that have considered
his position have suggested that it would not be accepted by the Supreme
Court, which would likely confine O’Hagan’s reasoning to misappropriation
cases.358 Thus, we should consider the legality of authorized PDIT under a
legal regime in which classical insider trading liability is not limited to
deceptive insider trading.
2. If Even Candid Classical Insider Trading is
Forbidden, But Fiduciary Duties Are
Contractual in Nature
If the law imposes liability for classical insider trading even if the
possibility of such trading is disclosed in advance (so that the trader is not
feigning fidelity to her trading partner), then the basis of liability must be
something other than fraud. Most likely, the basis for liability would be

357

See supra note 353.

358

See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha
Stewart, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2055 n. 141 (2005) (arguing that Prakash’s
position “is incorrect in that there is no case that follows Prakash’s analysis in the
case of classic insider trading (i.e., where the source of the information is the issuer
of the securities)”); Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital
Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 568 n. 141 (2002) (noting Prakash’s position
and responding that “it is doubtful that courts would accept a one-time blanket
statement of an intent to trade as equivalent to the disclosure of the actual material
non-public information upon which insiders seek to trade”); Zohar Goshen &
Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1262 n. 108 (2001) (“A proper reading
of O’Hagan implies a key distinction between inside information in the classic
sense—information originating from the affected firm used by one of its insiders—
and a different type of inside information—information generated by outsiders who
are not employees of the affected firm. While the prohibition on trading involving
classic inside information is clearly mandatory, and cannot be contracted around,
the prohibition on trading involving information generated by outsiders is subject to
contracting like any other property interest.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 52 SMU L.
REV. 1589, 1647-48 (1999) (acknowledging that O’Hagan’s reasoning would seem
to suggest that candid classical insider trading does not violate Rule 10b-5, but
predicting that the Supreme Court would eschew such a position); Alan Strudler &
Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375,
436 n. 271 (1999) (rejecting “the insidious suggestion that a prior disclosure of an
intention to trade on material nonpublic information or ‘candid insider trading’
should be countenanced as an exception”).

80

some fiduciary duty breach that would be taken to violate Rule 10b-5.359 If
the gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is breach of fiduciary duty,
rather than fraud, then even authorized PDIT could violate Rule 10b-5 if the
trading at issue involved a breach of the requisite duty.
But this assumes that fiduciary duties cannot be altered via contract, a
point upon which legal scholars vehemently disagree.360 Under the view
espoused by the “contractarians,” who maintain that fiduciary duties are
ultimately contractual in nature, a corporation could effectively legalize
PDIT even if the gravamen of a classical insider trading violation were
breach of fiduciary duty rather than deception based on feigned fidelity to
the trading partner. By authorizing PDIT, the corporation would be
contractually tailoring the fiduciary duties its agents owe to shareholders so
that those duties would not include a duty to disclose material, non-public
359

Hinging Rule 10b-5 liability on a breach of fiduciary duty that does not amount
to actual deception would seem to run afoul of the Supreme Court’s Santa Fe
holding. See supra note 348 (discussing holding of Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462).

360
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information before trading on it. A shareholder who purchased stock from
an informed insider could not claim fiduciary breach, for the duty owed by
the insider would have been contractually tailored to exclude a disclosure
duty.361 Thus, authorized PDIT is legally permissible, even if the gravamen
of classical insider trading is breach of fiduciary duty rather than a feigning
of fidelity, if fiduciary duties are contractually alterable.
3. If Even Candid Classical Insider Trading Is
Forbidden, and Fiduciary Duties Are Not
Purely Contractual
Under the two legal scenarios considered so far, a corporation could
authorize price-enhancing, as well as price-decreasing, insider trading.
Under the first legal scenario (i.e., only deceptive trading is prohibited),
authorized PEIT would be insulated because there could be no deception
where the seller, in light of the corporation’s ex ante authorization of PEIT,
had no legitimate expectation that an insider would refrain from buying
company stock on the basis of material, non-public information.362 Under
the second legal scenario (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty is the crux of the
violation, but fiduciary duties are ultimately contractual), the corporation’s
express authorization of PEIT would effectively tailor insiders’ fiduciary
duties to exclude any obligation to disclose non-public information before
trading. Suppose, though, that the true state of the law is that (1) even
candid insider trading is forbidden, and (2) fiduciary duties are not
contractually alterable. Under that legal regime, which is maximally hostile
to a liberalized insider trading policy and appears to reflect the status quo,
authorized PEIT would probably be illegal, but authorized PDIT would be
legally permissible.
First consider why this most restrictive view of the law would permit
authorized PDIT. It is a basic principle of corporate law that a corporate
agent’s fiduciary duty is ultimately owed to the corporation itself, not to
individual shareholders.363 Of course, most agent conduct that might injure
361
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an individual shareholder would also threaten some sort of injury to the
corporation’s business operations and/or financial prospects and would
therefore be barred by the agent’s fiduciary duty to the corporation. But
where an agent’s action might disadvantage an individual shareholder but
would benefit the corporation as a whole, the agent’s fiduciary duties should
not preclude him from taking that action. After all, the agent’s ultimate duty
of loyalty is to the corporation itself.
With respect to disclosed PDIT, this is the situation an agent confronts:
The agent’s sale on the basis of negative inside information might injure an
existing shareholder (assuming, of course, that the purchaser is a current
shareholder; if not, there’s no way the agent’s action could involve any kind
of breach of duty).364 The corporation as a whole, though, would actually
benefit from the agent’s action, for the disclosed PDIT would tend to reduce
equity overvaluation365 and the costs associated therewith.366 In short, the
agent faces a situation where an individual shareholder’s interest in candor
conflicts with the broader interests of the corporation as a whole. Since the
agent’s fiduciary duty is ultimately owed to the corporation, not to
individual shareholders,367 she would breach no duty by furthering the
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corporation’s welfare (and, admittedly, her own financial interests)368 at the
expense of an individual shareholder’s financial interest. Thus, even if the
gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is breach of a non-waiveable
fiduciary duty, a corporate agent could engage in authorized PDIT.
With respect to insider trading that increases stock price, the situation is
different. First, in every instance of PEIT, the insider will be dealing with a
shareholder of the firm itself; with PDIT, by contrast, the insider will
frequently be dealing with a party who, at the time the trade is executed,
standsat arms -length from the insider and is owed no fiduciary duties.369
Moreover, while the specific facts and circumstances of any instance of
PEIT would determine whether corporate damage could result, it is easy to
envision situations in which such trading would harm the corporation itself,
as well as the individual shareholder; as noted, PEIT, unlike PDIT, may
thwart otherwise available corporate opportunities.370 Finally, the “good
news” upon which the insider engaging in PEIT bases his trade should likely
belong to the corporation, whereas the “bad news” underlying an instance of
PDIT should probably belong to the insider himself.371 There is, in other
words, a more obvious property rights violation (and, thus, breach of
fiduciary duty) involved in PEIT. Unlike PDIT, then, PEIT probably cannot
be authorized if the gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is the
breach of a non-waiveable fiduciary duty.
CONCLUSION
Substantial equity overvaluation is bad for investors. Most notably, it
tends to create significant agency costs that result in the destruction of
corporate value. Recognizing this, legislators and regulators have recently
imposed a host of “top down” measures aimed at preventing such
368
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overvaluation.372 Early evidence indicates that this top down approach,
hastily implemented as a result of what Professor Larry Ribstein has dubbed
“Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome,”373 may create greater costs than
benefits.374 This Article has therefore proposed a market-oriented, “bottom
up” approach to preventing or reducing equity overvaluation. The proposed
approach would generally permit disclosed insider trading transactions that
would tend to drive an overvalued stock’s price downward toward actual
value, while generally banning insider trading that would increase a stock’s
price. Given the benefits and costs occasioned by the different species of
insider trading, this asymmetric insider trading regime is likely the policy
most investors and managers would agree to if they were practically and
legally able to do so. Securities regulators should therefore adopt it as the
default policy for corporations.
In asking what shareholders and corporate managers would bargain for
were they practically and legally able to do so, this Article builds on the
work of scholars who have argued that insider trading policy should be
handled via contract – i.e., that corporate constituents should be allowed to
allocate the right to inside information among themselves as they see fit.375
The Article makes two contributions to the work of these so-called
contractarians. First, by segregating the two types of insider trading (priceenhancing and price-decreasing) and assessing the investor benefits and
harms occasioned by each, the Article is able to predict the insider trading
bargain corporate constituents would likely strike. That is an important
contribution, for even if a purely contractarian approach were adopted, the
law must select a default rule that will apply absent any express contractual
provision, and that rule should reflect majoritarian preferences.376 Second,
the Article proposes an approach that could be implemented under current
law. Most insider trading scholars believe that current legal doctrine would
not sanction a pure contractarian approach under which corporations may
opt out of the disclose or abstain rule. By contrast, the asymmetric approach
advocated herein, which essentially involves opting out of the disclose or
abstain rule for publicly announced price-decreasing insider trades, could be
372
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adopted under current law.
The approach therefore represents an
immediately achievable first step toward the deregulation of insider trading.
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